Tag Archives: bankruptcy

California Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Law

16 Dec
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California Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Law

California businesses have a couple of options to deal with dire financial conditions, and filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy can be an attractive option. However, it can be a bit complex, and to be successful, the business should consult experienced legal counsel to prepare the necessary filings.

  1. Definition

    • Chapter 11 in the federal Bankruptcy Code is specific to business and allows for a reorganization of debt and liabilities owed to creditors. Businesses most commonly affected by Chapter 11 include corporations, sole proprietorships, partnerships and other types of companies.

How Creditors Get Paid Under a Chapter 11 Plan

16 Dec
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  • Obviously, the debtor doesn’t have sufficient ready funds to pay all creditors at the time of filing. Instead, an approved plan relies on future business earnings and profits to address creditor debts. The debt claims are prioritized with taxes owed being paid first. Secured claims will come next and unsecured debts follow third with partial payments.

Don’t Declare Bankruptcy Before You Need To

16 Dec

Today, many people are deciding to declare bankruptcy. With so many people being laid off, a lot of people are deciding to file for bankruptcy but you need to realize that it is not for everyone. There are other ways to pay off debt without going to such an extreme; indeed, an option that should be used only as a last resort.

Before deciding to declare bankruptcy, the first thing that needs to be done is to make an appointment with a bankruptcy lawyer. Find out what type of bankruptcy they handle because there are two types and not all lawyers handle both types. Some bankruptcy lawyers will even give clients a free evaluation to see where they are financially. This free evaluation should be done in person, since that is far more effective than trying to do it over the phone. Sit down and talk to the lawyer, discuss your options. The lawyer is there to help the person who is in debt. Don’t be afraid to tell them your financial situation. The lawyer may have other options for you.

Once the lawyer decides if it is necessary for you to declare bankruptcy, then he or she will tell you which type they think will be best for you. The lawyer will explain to the client how much their fees are to file. A Chapter Seven bankruptcy is when all debts are gone once the bankruptcy is filed. Chapter 13 bankruptcies require the debtor to pay the debt out in three to five years.

Chapter Seven is the hardest only because the debtor needs to do many things before they can file. The lawyer will first fill out all of the paperwork with their client and list all of their debts. Fill out information on their debts online and pay the full amount of the bankruptcy.

The lawyer will offer their clients ways to pay the bankruptcy fees. Bankruptcy fees can be paid each month, but if a debtor wants to hurry up and get the debts off of their backs, it may be beneficial to pay the lawyer as soon as possible. Also, the lawyer will not file the paperwork until all the fees are paid. So the bill collectors will still contact you until it is filed. Once the bankruptcy is filed, the debtor goes to court with their lawyer and the debts will be gone in no time. The client does not have to do any speaking during the court process. The lawyer does it all.

A debtor may not need to declare bankruptcy when they don’t have enough debts. The lawyer will tell the debtor on settling any debts that they have. Contact each debtor and explain to them that you want to settle. Be firm with the amount that you can pay. The lawyer will explain to you that if the debt collector does not want to settle, don’t worry about the debt, especially if you don’t have property for them to seize.

For more insights and additional information about things you should consider before you Declare Bankruptcy as well as being given the opportunity to get a free bankruptcy evaluation from a qualified bankruptcy lawyer in your local area, please visit our web site at http://www.bankruptcy-data.com.

How and When to Reopen a Bankruptcy Case

8 Sep

Sometimes people want to reopen a closed bankruptcy case because they failed to invoke important procedures while their bankruptcy case was open.

BankruptcyPetitioniStockPhoto.jpgFortunately it’s usually possible to reopen the bankruptcy and play catch-up. Common reasons for wanting to reopen a bankruptcy case include:

  • failing to timely file an Official Form 23 (pre-discharge counseling certification)
  • failing to name an important creditor or list valuable property, or
  • failing to take necessary steps to remove a judgment lien from real estate.

The process for reopening a bankruptcy case involves two steps.

Step One: Ex Parte Motion to Reopen. The first step is what’s known as an ex-parte motion to reopen the case. This is a request to the judge that the case be reopened without giving advance notice to the creditors or scheduling a hearing. The paperwork, which consists of the motion or request, and an order granting the request, is pretty simple and widely available, both in Nolo’s How to File for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, by Albin Renauer, Steve Elias, and Robin Leonard, and various bankruptcy lawyer websites.

Step Two: Request for the Desired Action. The second step is to request (by motion and order) that the judge allow the desired action, for instance the removal of a judicial lien on real estate, or the entry of an order of discharge.

The fee for reopening a bankruptcy case is $274, so it’s obviously less expensive to get everything done while you case is open. However, if you are trying to remove a lien worth many thousands of dollars, or asking for a discharge an expensive student loan, the fee to reopen the case is relatively unimportant.

Chapter 11 Bankruptcy basic

8 Sep

 

     Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a reorganization procedure used by businesses, including sole proprietors, partnerships, and corporations. The debtor in chapter 11 files a petition which includes a list of assets and liabilities, and a detailed statement of financial affairs. The debtor will typically act as his own trustee, called a “debtor in possession”, and will remain in possession of all estate property. The court can appoint a trustee for cause shown, including mismanagement.

 

 

The Debtor

 

About one month after the filing, the debtor and his attorney attend a meeting of creditors. The debtor files monthly operating reports, showing income and disbursements, profit and loss, and a balance sheet, and pays quarterly fees to the U.S. Trustee based on the amount of money disbursed.

 

The debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan during the first 4 months. Thereafter, creditors are permitted to file plans. The Chapter 11 plan is accompanied by a disclosure statement, which describes the debtor’s financial circumstances, including:

 

  • Prior History and cause of the Filing
  • Assets and liabilities
  • Income and expenses
  • Treatment of creditors
  • Liquidation analysis
  • Projections of earnings
  • Tax consequences
  • Discussion of options

 

The Plan

 

     The plan places creditors holding similar types of claims (i.e., unsecured, priority, etc.) into the same class. Creditors whose claims are impaired are allowed to vote on the plan. A class is impaired if its Chapter 11 Bankruptcy legal rights are altered by the plan. To be confirmed by the court, the creditors actually voting must approve the plan by a majority in number, and by a 2/3 majority in dollar amount of claims. At least one impaired class must approve the plan. If a class votes against the plan, the court may still approve (“cram-down”) the plan if it finds that the plan is “fair and equitable” and does not unfairly discriminate.

 

     A plan often calls for the debtor to remain in business, and to repay creditors from future earnings, from borrowings, or from sale of assets. In Chapter 11, priority claims, including recent tax claims, are required to be paid in full, plus interest. Secured claims are required to be paid in full, also with interest. Unsecured non-priority claims are required to be paid a dividend at least equal to that which they would receive if it were a Chapter 7 case. Within these limits, there are an infinite variety of Chapter 11 plans, each based on the debtor’s own financial situation. 

 

     The law provides for formation of creditors committees to provide input and monitor the debtor’s progress.

The Homeowners struggle

2 Mar

Warren op-ed: Banking on Hypocrisy

posted by Katie Porter

Check out Credit Slips co-blogger Elizabeth Warren’s op-ed on Politico, entitled Banking on Hypocrisy. She quotes extensively from a letter that the American Bankers Association sent to banking regulators in 2006 in opposition to the proposed intra-agency guidance that would have required better underwriting of nontraditional and subprime loans. While it’s entertaining–and painful–to read just how wrong the ABA was in its assessment of mortgage risk, Professor Warren’s point is to compare the ABA’s position on consumer protection regulation in 2006 with its current stance. In the memo, the ABA decried the “marriage of inconvenience between supervision and consumer protection,” saying that it blurred “long-established jurisdictional lines.” The ABA recommended that the safety and soundness provisions be separated from consumer protection provisions. Yet, now the ABA has opposed a stand-alone Consumer Financial Protection Agency, saying that safety and soundness and consumer protection need to be performed by the same agency. The ABA reminds me of Mayor Quimby from the Simpsons: “Very well, if that is the way the winds are blowing, let no one say I don’t also blow.”  (Thanks to Bob Lawless for offering up this quote the other day in another context; it’s so apt these days!)

Redemption (of the 722 variety) for Struggling Homeowners

posted by Katie Porter

Homeowners continue to struggle, foreclosures continue to climb, and loan modification efforts continue to lag. A persistent problem, pointedly described in these letters (July 10, 2009 and March 4, 2010) from Rep. Barney Frank to the large banks, is that the banks that hold second mortgages are not modifying those loans. (Yep, these are the same banks that took TARP money). The reluctance of the second lienholders to agree to a modification gums up the process for trying to get a modification on first, and usually much larger, mortgages. The investors in the first loan somewhat sensibly resist modifications, particularly those with principal write-downs, pointing out that it doesn’t seem right that they should take a haircut, while junior lienholders refuse to modify their loans. And while the Administration announced new initiatives with HAMP and FHA to help with the second lien problem, I remain skeptical. After all back in April 2009–a year ago, they also made an announcement that they were revising their loan modification programs to deal with second liens. Hhmm . . . Deja vu? Why wait another year while servicers build a platform and train personnel, and Treasury writes regulations, etc.

Here’s a legislative solution to the second lienholder hold-out problem. Congress should amend section 722 to permit chapter 7 bankruptcy filers to be able to redeem any junior loan on a debtor’s principal residence. Current bankruptcy law permits debtors in chapter 7 bankruptcy to redeem personal property, such as cars, by paying the lienholder the value of the collateral. This redemption right exists regardless of the terms of the loan contract. The effect of the redemption is to remove the lien from the collateral. To redeem, a debtor must pay the secured party the amount of the allowed secured claim that is secured by such lien in full at the time of the redemption. If a secured party is completely underwater because the value of the first mortgage exceeds the house’s value, the debtor would file a motion to redeem under 722 and pay nothing (that’s the amount of the allowed secured claim!))  I think this legislation would provide some real leverage to get banks to agree to write down second loans.

Continue reading “Redemption (of the 722 variety) for Struggling Homeowners” »

March 30, 2010 at 6:36 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (10)

Foreclosures: What About the States?

posted by Adam Levitin
Here’s something that’s puzzled me:  no state has yet to enact any serious foreclosure moratorium.  In the 1930s, these moratoria sprouted up all around the country, and foreclosure rates (but not default rates), were much lower than today.   California imposed a 90 day moratorium, but that’s not going to do much.  Why haven’t Nevada or Arizona enacted a more serious foreclosure moratorium?  What’s the political economy story in those states?  Any thoughts?

March 5, 2010 at 8:31 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (14)

Produce the (Bogus?) Paper

posted by Katie Porter

In 2007, I wrote an article showing that notes and mortgages were often missing from bankruptcy mortgage claims, despite a clear rule that they should be attached. That finding did not establish that companies do not have such documentation. At that time (a long-ago era of blind faith in commercial entities), some people suggested to me perhaps creditors simply do not wish to be bothered with the time and expense to comply but that all transfers were valid. In the intervening years, story after story has emerged about mortgage servicers who brought foreclosure cases without being able to show their clients had a right to foreclose. Homeowners, desperate to stave off foreclosure while negotiating for a loan modification or waiting for HAMP to become operational, are increasingly demanding that lenders “produce the paper.” In legal terms, this means the servicer should show that it is the authorized agent of a trust or other entity that is the holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage.

Upon challenge, many companies have been unable to show they had the paperwork, leading to their cases being dismissed (see here, here and here for some examples). The hard part has been to figure out the longer term consequences of lacking a proper chain of negotiation and assignment. What is the effect of an assignment of a mortgage in “blank”? Is this an incomplete real estate instrument that has no valid effect, similar to a deed without a grantee? Can parties go back after the fact and create assignments today to correct problems in transfers from years ago (and if so, what about when the chain of title involves a now defunct lender or bank? what about corrections to chains of title made after the debtor files bankruptcy and the automatic stay is in place?)

Lenders and their agents seem to busy churning out assignments to repair defects and create a paper trail. Of course, with all this paperwork creation, there are bound to be some slips-ups. Follow this link and click on “view image” to see the public recordation of an assignment “for good and valuable consideration” of a mortgage to “Bogus Assignee for Intervening Asmts, whose address is XXXXXX.” If this works to assign a mortgage, what is the purpose of requiring assignments at all?

February 15, 2010 at 3:07 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (10)

Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble

posted by Adam Levitin

A popular explanation of the financial crisis lays the blame at the feet of the Federal Reserve for lax monetary policy.  In this story, the Fed dropped interest rates starting in 2001 and kept rates too low for too long.  Low rates induced an orgy of mortgage borrowing for leveraged home speculation.

It’s a nice story.  Only problem is it doesn’t really hold up under inspection.  Low rates in 2001-2003 did fuel an amazing mortgage refinancing boom, but not a purchase boom, and the boom was mainly in conventional fixed-rate mortgages, not the exotic products later years.  Moreover, despite the refinancing boom, no housing bubble was emerging in this period.

The Fed started to raise rates in mid 2004 and continued to do so until mid-2006.  It was during this period that the bubble emerged, when rates were going up.  (To be fair, some might argue for an earlier date to the bubble, even as far back as the late 1990s.)  If we date the bubble from 2004, it’s not consistent with a rate-driven bubble story, although rates were still extremely low in absolute terms during this period.

The monetary policy story, however, really falls apart when one compares the US and Canada, as the graph below does.  Canadian interest rates, and perhaps more importantly, Canadian mortgage rates, track US rates pretty closely.  Yet the US had a housing bubble, and Canada did not.   This means we have to look somewhere other than monetary policy to explain the housing bubble.  The answer, I believe, lies in method and regulation of housing finance.

US Canadian Mortgage Comparison

Continue reading “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble” »

Modification Scams

posted by Katie Porter

While the loan origination fraud is largely shut down, the foreclosure crisis has spawned a whole new consumer fraud in the form of foreclosure rescue and loan modification scams. These companies offer to help consumers get a loan modification or to fend off a foreclosure in return for high, upfront fees. A great insider view of how these companies profit on the backs of desperate consumers is available in the receiver’s report in U.S. Foreclosure Relief, which was shut down in response to enforcement action by the Federal Trade Commission and the Missouri and California State Attorneys General. The receiver describes the business as a “high-pressure, cash-up-front telephone sales business targeting distressed homeowners” and gives details on just how these companies rake in incredible profits while stringing along homeowners. In the case of U.S. Foreclosure Relief, the company advertised a “90% success rate” when in fact only 11% of its clients got completed modifications (no details on whether the terms of such modifications offered any meaningful relief or not). Sales agents competed to win a Rolex watch, were told to “stop being so nice” and instead to hammer home to consumers how much worse their problems would get if they didn’t hire a modification consultant, and got paid a bonus if the consumer paid via direct deposit. How profitable was this model? Consumers paid $2950 for “assistance,” and U.S. Foreclosure had gross revenue of $5.9 million, with operating expenses of $1.7 million, producing $4.5 million in profit. Nice margin, huh?

Thinking of starting up such a business yourself but, of course, being honest and legitimate? Think again. The receiver concluded that if the business were run lawfully, profitability would be “severely challenged.” In fact, I recently asked a panel of experts on foreclosure rescue scams if they thought ANYONE, even one of them, could legitimately advertise that they provided loan modification assistance. Given the long odds in getting a loan modification, even with HAMP finally somewhat operational, perhaps the best one can offer is to take on the frustrating work of trying to get a modification. But without some chance of success, perhaps most modification assistance is a mirage.

November 12, 2009 at 6:28 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack (0)

Subprime, Exotic or “Crap?” Mortgage Industry Lingo

posted by Katie Porter

Former Credit Slips guestblogger Max Gardner is always trying to understand the real mechanics and economics of mortgage servicing. At one of his infamous bootcamps, he had an employee at a now-deceased mortgage servicer share an insider’s perspective on default mortgage servicing. The employee used some terms of art that are pretty revealing of the serious problems in the mortgage industry. For example, servicing technicians who have to load a new set of subprime or Alt-A loans into the system call those loans “Crap of the Crop,” because even on arrival at the servicer all or almost all of the loans already have major problems such as incomplete documentation, existing defaults, etc. Another popular term is “scratch-and-dent” loans. Quite a bit more colorful, then “subprime” isn’t it?

The explanation for why homeowners can’t get reliable answers on loan modifications is that the default servicing technicians are “cab drivers,” when successful HAMP and other loss mitigation programs would require “cup drivers” in NASCAR parlance. The servicing industry doesn’t care much for “CRAMP,” their term for Hope Now and HAMP, which the former employee described as a vehicle designed for an 8-lane Interstate running on a two-lane country road. And those qualified written requests that consumers can use to get information on their mortgage loans? Those QWRS are “Quite a lot of Written Regurgitated S**t” because most consumers won’t know what to do with the information that the system spits out in response to the request. Depressing that the best legal tool consumers have may be aptly described with such acronym. If there is a bright spot here, it’s that folks like Max who are holding the industry’s feet to the fire are making a difference. In fact, Max got his own term. A “BCA” is a boot camp attorney, whose request means a lot of work and trouble for the unlucky servicing tech who gets such correspondence.

November 5, 2009 at 6:00 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack (0)

How to Fail My Secured Credit Exam Two Different Ways

posted by Bob Lawless

By way of Underbelly comes this story from the Seattle Times chronicling the many failures at the now defunct WaMu. Among the stories was that a WaMu banker gave O.J. Simpson a second mortgage on his Florida home despite the existence of a huge judgment lien against Simpson arising out of his civil trial for killing his wife and her friend. Why did WaMu think it could collect the second mortgage? According to the news story, Simpson had put a note in the file saying he did not do it, and therefore the judgment was “no good.” OK, that’s pretty dumb and, for my students who read the blog, would not be a passing answer in my secured credit class.

What the reporter (but hopefully not my students) missed is that the second mortgage was likely collectible anyway. Florida has an unlimited homestead exemption that would prevent enforcement of the judgment lien against the home, assuming it otherwise met the definition of a homestead. Voluntary transfers, like a second mortgage, are not protected by the homestead statute. (If you’re wondering why that is, consider how much mortgage lending there would be if the mortgage could not be enforced because of a homestead statute.) A comment on the Daily Weekly blog (hosted by the Seattle Times) picked up on the point about the homestead exemption and the role it should have played in this lending decision.

The “note in the file” story sounds too funny to be true, and in this case, I think it probably is. Florida (and every other state) law is the reason some WaMu Florida banker thought they could enforce the second mortgage. Of course, this is just the legal part of the lending decision. As the Daily Weekly blog story asked, why was WaMu so willing to give Simpson the benefit of the doubt and extend a loan?

Risks of Reverse Mortgages

posted by Katie Porter

In a world of news stories about crippled credit markets, at least one group of Americans still faces the problem of aggressive loan marketing. Senior citizens are on pace to set a new record in 2009 for reverse mortgages, complicated financial products that enables seniors to extract equity in their homes. A new report from the National Consumer Law Center makes parallels between today’s reverse mortgage market and the subprime market of a few years ago (yes, the market that exploded the world economy). Tara Twomey, a repeat Credit Slips guestblogger describes in the report how incentives for broker compensation, a rapidly growing securitization market, and weak or non-existent regulation all expose seniors to risky transactions.

The key recommendation is the imposition of a suitability standard on lenders. That is, lenders and brokers would have to make a good faith determination of whether a loan was appropriate given a senior’s situation. The NCLC made this same recommendation for subprime loans in 2006, and it was ignored. Given the relatively modest size of the market ($17 billion), the vulnerability of the senior population, including the fact that these are once-in-a-lifetime/no-learning-curve transactions, and the collossal fallout from identical conditions in the subprime market, the reverse mortgage market seems like an ideal chance to give the suitability standard a real-life test drive. If America had a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, it might take-up that opportunity. In the meantime,it’s consumer regulation as usual, with some occasional words of warning from regulators with limited authority and pending Congressional legislation that takes aim at only the most egregious abuses.

October 7, 2009 at 6:58 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tenant Protections in Foreclosure

posted by Katie Porter

A foreclosure has a ripple effect, as a number of commentators have observed. Foreclosed properties often sit vacant, leading to nuisance concerns, lower property values for neighboring houses, and higher crime rates. But some properties are not vacant on the day of foreclosure, and these occupied properties generate their own externalities.

After foreclosure, the new owner (usually the lender is the purchaser at the foreclosure sale) will typically send someone to see if the property is vacant. If not, the lender files an eviction or lawful detainer action. In many instances, especially in those formerly-booming real estate markets like Florida and Nevada, the occupants are tenants, not the homeowners. Depending on state law, renters often have no right to notice of the foreclosure and no right to remain in the property. The Chicago sheriff, Thomas Dart, stopped doing evictions after foreclosure last fall because of concerns about unjust harm to tenants.

Title VII of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act provides uniform federal protection to tenants after foreclosure–at least until the law expires on Dec. 30, 2012 (apparently the date by which someone thought the foreclosure “crisis” will have abated). The law requires the new owner of a foreclosed property to allow tenants to stay in the foreclosed property for the remainder of the lease. If there is no lease, or if the lease is terminable at will under state law, tenants must be given at least 90 days’ notice before they may be evicted. This is a floor that does not preempt more generous state law.
I’m interested in how financial institutions and tenants are going to deal with these requirements. Lenders have attorneys who routinely handle evictions after foreclosure. Being a landlord is a different task. Are tenants supposed to call the former owners’ mortgage servicer when their pipes burst? If not, how is the tenant supposed to learn exactly who is the new owner of the property? Are note holders actively hiring property management companies to comply with this rule? Perhaps more interestingly, the bill doesn’t seem to permit an eviction during the 90 days even if the tenants declare they aren’t going to pay a dime of rent!
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has hardly offered answers to national banks. After waiting three months after the law’s effective date, it put out a one-page release advising banks to “adopt policies and procedures to ensure compliance.” Gee, that’s helpful. I’m betting the readers of Credit Slips will have some more concrete thoughts about this.

Overspenders to Face Tax Audits?

posted by Katie Porter

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal reported on a new effort by the IRS to catch tax cheats. The IRS is going to compare data on mortgage-interest payments provided by financial institutions with homeowners’ declarations of income on tax returns. The idea is that people must have more income than they reported to the IRS if they are able to make their mortgage payments, the bulk of which for homeowners with new loans from purchase or refinance, will be payments toward interest. Using data from 2005, the Treasury inspector general said that “tens of thousands of homeowners who paid more than $20,000 in mortgage interest” reported income that appeared “insufficient” to have covered their mortgage payments and basic living expenses. I don’t doubt that fact, but I see an alternate hypothesis to explain the situation. These families are accurately reporting their income, but they are just spending more than they earn. They have houses they cannot afford, and they use Capital One to finance their basic living expenses so their income dollars can go to mortgage payments. Back in 2003-005 when these data were gathered, the credit market was loose and many families made up shortfalls in monthly living using credit cards, or in some instances, doing a cash-out refinance, and then living off the cash, expecting the housing market to sustain this strategy. Relying on debt to make ends meet has always carried risks, including bankruptcy risk. Should we add the risk of a tax audit to the reasons that families need to keep income and expenses in alignment?

September 8, 2009 at 7:40 AM in Consumerism, Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (1)

Mortgage Modification Investor Lawsuit

posted by Adam Levitin

The District Court ruling in Greenwich Financial Services v. Countrywide, addressing the servicer safe harbor provision for doing loan modifications, is linked here.  See here for the NYTimes story.  See here for the complaint.

Quick version:  the ruling went against Countrywide, but it was a procedurally based ruling about whether the case belongs in Federal District Court or state court at this point, not on the merits.  (As an aside, I think the reason this case wasn’t removed to the Federal District Court on diversity jurisdiction grounds is because Countrywide is a “citizen” of New York, so under the Class Action Fairness Act removal isn’t possible.  28 U.S.C. 1441(b).)

What I find most fascinating about this case is that it is the only investor lawsuit related to modifications about which I know.  (But please post in the comments if I’m wrong on this.)  For a while the story we heard from servicers was one of avoiding loan mods due to the fear of litigation (of course, there could just have easily been litigation for not doing mods).  Interesting how that litigation never materialized.

August 20, 2009 at 8:13 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Complaining to HUD about Servicing: Thunder on Deaf Ears?

posted by Katie Porter

In my own research, and frequently on Credit Slips, I’ve noted problems that homeowners face in dealing with their mortgage servicers. As a recent post from guest blogger Max Gardner explained, many of these problems are structural to the servicing industry. I think the people on the phone are good folks, trying to be helpful, but without the tools, training, and resources that they need to do so. One marker of the increasing pressure that servicers are under is the HUD complaint statistics. According to this Pro Public report, mortgage servicing issues were 31% of  complaints to HUD in 2006. Just two years later in 2008, that fraction has jumped to 78%. No surprise here. More families are in default or foreclosure and that means more friction between homeowners and servicers. And as many of us have pointed out, consumers aren’t the mortgage servicers’ customers–the mortgage note holders are. So it makes sense that consumer satisfaction (“non-customer satisfaction”, so to speak) is low in the industry.

The interesting part to me is that HUDs own complaint website doesn’t even list mortgage servicing as an area of concern. Four out of five consumers who contact HUD are frustrated with their mortgage servicer, but HUD doesn’t even acknowledge–at least in the obvious location–that it is in charge of complaints about mortgage servicing? I think this reflects a real problem in consumer protection regulation. Perhaps HUD sees mortgage servicing as just pretty far afield from its core concerns about housing discrimination and federal housing programs. HUD, more than any other agency anyway, has authority to implement the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), which provides a process (a QWR) for consumers to motivate servicers to respond to problem. But historically, and still today, HUD’s oversight of mortgage servicing could generously be characterized as “thin.” Is mortgage servicing an example of the need for a Financial Product Safety Commission or will the mortgage market (when, and if, it revives itself) offer new and improved servicing models that reduce consumer frustration and improve transparency?

August 20, 2009 at 7:30 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

Private Tax Collection

posted by Bob Lawless

The New York Times has a story today that Credit Slips readers will want to check out. It catalogs the growing trend of local governments to sell their real estate tax debts to private investors. The reporter, Jack Healy, succinctly states the opposing policy points:

Investors say the arrangement actually benefits everyone. School districts, fire departments and public parks get an infusion of cash. The investors take on a risky but potentially high-yielding investment. And taxpayers do not have to pick up the slack from scofflaw landlords or tax evaders. 

Governments, of course, can charge interest and penalties too, and they foreclose on properties for back taxes. But governments charge interest rates that are half what private investors charge — often offering no-interest payment plans — and are also more likely to be concerned about the long-term prospects of neighborhoods.

All good points, but there is nothing that the ivory tower can’t make more confusing.

Continue reading “Private Tax Collection” »

Show Me the Original Note and I Will Show You the Money

posted by O. Max Gardner III

As mortgage delinquencies rise each month, and as the number of foreclosures increase each quarter, the “new mantra” of many pro-se and represented consumers is to demand that the mortgage servicer “prove up the original note.” Is this just some new and creative gimmick that has been sold to the desperate homeowners and to a few lawyers who have attended “progressive” seminars or is there really something to it? I submit that there is really something to it.

In my last Credit Slips post, I wrote about what I call the “Alphabet Problem.” Succinctly stated, this problem arises out of the necessity for a true sale of the mortgage note and mortgage from the originator to the sponsor for the securitized trust; then from the sponsor to the depositor for the securitized trust; and finally from the depositor to the owner Trustee for the trust. These multiple “true sales” are necessary in order to make the original asset (the note and mortgage) bankruptcy-remote and FDIC-remote frin the originator in the event the originator files for bankruptcy or is taken over by the FDIC.

Continue reading “Show Me the Original Note and I Will Show You the Money” »

The Alphabet Problem and the Pooling and Servicing Agreements

posted by O. Max Gardner III

The securitization of residential mortgage notes has created a maze of complex issues and problems for the bankruptcy and foreclosure courts. One fundamental issue is who is the actual holder and owner of the mortgage note. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to dig deep into the contracts, warranties and representations that were executed in the formation of the securitized trust.

The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) is the document that actually creates a residential mortgage backed securitized trust and establishes the obligations and authority of the Master Servicer and the Primary Servicer. The PSA also establishes some mandatory rules and procedures for the sales and transfers of the mortgages and mortgage notes from the originators to the trust. It is this unbroken chain of assignments and negotiations that creates what I have called “The Alphabet Problem.”

Continue reading “The Alphabet Problem and the Pooling and Servicing Agreements” »

What Does RESPA Have to do with Consumer Bankruptcy Cases?

posted by O. Max Gardner III

I have trained over 350 attorneys at my Bankruptcy Boot Camps and to my surprise less than 10 percent know what I mean when I refer to a “QWR.” This is shocking in that a reasonable QWR can provide the attorney for the Chapter 13 debtor with some of the very best discovery outside of a contested case or Adversary Proceeding. The QWR can be used to find out how the servicer for the securitized trust is applying the debtor’s money and the disbursements on the arrearage claim from the Chapter 13 Trustee. It can also be used to identify all of the “ancillary fees” and “collateral charges” that mortgage servicers are so fond of unilaterally adding to the debtor’s mortgage account, without any notice or the right to a hearing.

The provisions of RESPA which deal with mortgage servicing are generally found in either 12 U.S.C. § 2605 or § 2609. Section 2605, known as the “Servicer Act,” requires servicers to respond to borrower requests for information and correction of account errors. The “Servicer Act” provisions are where you find the authority for a Qualified Written Request. The Servicer Act provisions in § 2605 are significant because borrowers are given the right to sue for violations based on the express private right of action found in § 2605(f).

Continue reading “What Does RESPA Have to do with Consumer Bankruptcy Cases?” »

Countrywide Sanctioned by Ohio Court Citing Porter & Twomey

posted by Bob Lawless

As many Credit Slips readers may be aware, Countrywide Home Loans (which is now part of Bank of America) has been the subject of proceedings in several bankruptcy courts because of the shoddy recordkeeping behind their claims in bankruptcy cases. Judge Marilyn Shea-Stonum of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio recently sanctioned Countrywide for its conduct in these cases. Having previously found Countrywide to have committed sanctionable conduct, the question for Judge Shea-Stonum was the appropriate penalty.

The resulting opinion makes extensive reference to Credit Slips regular blogger Katie Porter and guest blogger Tara Twomey’s excellent Mortgage Study that documented the extent to which bankruptcy claims by mortgage servicers were often erroneous and not supported by evidence. Specifically, the court adopted Porter’s recommendation from a Texas Law Review article that mortgage servicers should disclose the amounts they are owed based on a standard form. Judge Shea-Stonum found that such a requirement would prevent future misconduct by Countrywide. All of Countrywide’s claims now or hereafter pending in this court have to be supported by the form attached to the end of the opinion.

If you look at the form and wonder “Weren’t mortgage servicers disclosing this information anyway?” The answer is that they often were not. Hence the need for such a form. Although the issue before the court was only what do to with Countrywide, we should move toward this sort of form as a requirement nationally for all mortgage servicers. (Hat-tip to Professor Marianne Culhane for pointing me toward this opinion.)

HAMP–Is It Really All About the Money?

posted by O. Max Gardner III

Are mortgage servicers really refusing to modify mortgage loans solely because of all of the “ancillary fees” they can generate from a completed foreclosure? Is the problem really all about the money or is there something more to it?

The New York Times reported about ten days ago that the HAMP mortgage servicers were reluctant to engage consumers in modifications because the companies collect such lucrative fees on delinquent mortgage loans. There is certainly a substantial body of evidence to support the “lucrative fees” disincentive theories. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston recently shed some light on this problem with a new study that concluded that only 3% of the seriously delinquent mortgages had been modified due to the “the simple fact that the lenders expect to recover more from a foreclosure that from a modified loan.” And, the number of reported bankruptcy cases where mortgage servicers have been sanctioned for imposing unlawful, illegal and unreasonable “collateral and ancillary fees” is substantial and perhaps monumental in their numbers.

Continue reading “HAMP–Is It Really All About the Money?” »

Truth in Lending or Truth in Ownership of Residential Mortgage Notes

posted by O. Max Gardner III

During my last two Bankruptcy Boot Camps, one of the topics we have discussed has been the recent amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, brought about by Section 404 of Public Law 111-22. Specifically, our interest has been focused on the new statutory requirement that a consumer-borrower must be sent a written notice within 30 days of any sale or assignment of a mortgage loan secured by his or her principal residence. Violations of this Section provide for statutory damages of up to $4,000 and reasonable legal fees. The amendments also clearly provide that the new notice rules are enforceable by a private right of action. 15 USC 1641.

Continue reading “Truth in Lending or Truth in Ownership of Residential Mortgage Notes” »

Mortgage Servicing Update

posted by Katie Porter

Complaints about mortgage servicers are piling up almost as fast as foreclosures. Yesterday CNN reported that the GAO has concluded that the Obama Administration’s HAMP and HARP programs to do loan modifications are off to a very, very slow start. The programs were announced in February, and to date we have 180,000 people in three-month trial modifications. That’s a far cry from the 3-4 million people the Administration believed would be helped. Consumer advocates say that servicers remain unresponsive to requests for loan modifications, citing the same stories of incompetent or inadequate personnel, lack of follow-up, and refusal to modify unless a homeowner is in default.

At the same time, judicial criticism of mortgage servicing is picking up steam. A good example is Bankruptcy Judge Diane Weiss Sigmund’s opinion, In re Taylor, released in April. The thoughtful opinion sheds light on the underbelly of mortgage servicing. She details the relationship between local and national counsel, Lender Processing Services (formerly d/b/a Fidelity National), and the mortgage servicer. Among other things, she finds that the attorney signing the proof of claim, a legal document filed with the court, reviewed a “sample” of 10% of the claims that his own signature was affixed to. In Taylor the proof of claim had the entirely wrong person’s note attached to it (I wonder about a privacy violation here as bankruptcy documents are public), and an incorrect payment amount.

On a monthly basis, Tara Twomey and I post an updated version of our Mortgage Servicing Resources document to our Mortgage Study website, which also contains our papers on the subject. We are grateful to colleagues from around the country who forward us interesting cases that we collect in this document, but we wish studying mortgage servicing wasn’t such a growth industry. We hope the Obama Administration can find a way to shape up mortgage servicers in time to help Americans keep their homes.

Can You Judge an Industry By a Few Blog Comments?

posted by Bob Lawless

I’m annoyed this morning. OK, for those of you who know me, I’ll make the necessary correction — I’m annoyed more than usual. And, yes, I’ve had my morning cup of coffee.

It seems that we are getting more and more of these sorts of comments on the blog: “Very informative post.” /s/ Friendly Mortgage Modifiers.com. Of course, the signature is always hyperlinked to a web page where someone purports to want to help people save their homes. These comments are a transparent attempt to draw traffic to these sites and always will be deleted pursuant to our policy against commercial marketing in the comments.

Continue reading “Can You Judge an Industry By a Few Blog Comments?” »

July 24, 2009 at 10:18 AM in Blog Stuff, Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (2)

Is Bankruptcy Mortgage Modification Back?

posted by Bob Lawless

As I write this, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and Courts is holding a hearing entitled, “The Worsening Foreclosure Crisis: Is It Time to Reconsider Bankruptcy Reform.” The witnesses include Credit Slips‘s own Adam Levitin.

After the Senate failed to support changing the Bankruptcy Code to allow judges to do mortgage modifications, it appeared to be a dead issue. The hearing is great news and hopefully an indication there may be some interest in moving the legislation forward. There have been increasing reports (e.g., here) recently that lenders are not doing voluntary mortgage modifications in the numbers that need to happen. Yeah, I know — who could have possibly foreseen the possibility that a solely voluntary system would not work? There need to be carrots that encourage lenders to do the modifications. The change in the bankruptcy law is the missing piece — the stick that makes the program work.

Does Securitization Affect Loan Modifications?

posted by Adam Levitin

A few days ago I wrote a long and detailed critique of a Boston Federal Reserve staff study that argued, among other things, that securitization was not a factor in the paucity of loan modifications.  The study reached this conclusion based largely on the similar rate of modifications for portfolio and securitized loans.  Although the study controls for the effect of the modification in terms of monthly payment, it otherwise assumes all modifications are created equal.  But clearly they are not.  There is a significant difference in redefault rates for securitized and portfolio loans, and the securitized loan mods perform much worse.  This is something the Boston Fed’s study cannot explain other than if there is (1) unobserved heterogeneity in the loans or (2) differences in the loan mods.

The nature of unobserved heterogeneity in data is that it can’t be observed, so all that can be said of (1) is that it is a possibility.  But assuming that there isn’t a heterogeneity problem about the unmodified loans, what about the mods?  Is there heterogeneity problem in mods that makes comparisons of mod rates a poor measure for evaluating the impact of securitization.  It appears that there is.
The Boston Fed study did not control for the effect of the loan modification on the homeowner’s equity. It does have controls for LTV and negative equity, but those don’t seem to have been applied to the serviced/portfolio distinction, at least in the paper.  I’m not sure whether there is sufficient data to do this, but what the study could have controlled for, but did not, was whether the modification involved a reduction in the unpaid principal balance.  In this aspect, there is a significant difference between portfolio and securitized loans.
OCC/OTS Mortgage Metrics Data for the first quarter of 2009 indicates that very few loan modifications have involved principal balance reductions.  In fact out of 185,186 loan modifications in Q1 2009, only 3,398 (1.8%) involved principal balance reductions.   All but 4 of those 3,398 principal balance reductions were on loans held in portfolio.  The other 4 are quite likely data recording errors.  This means that there is heterogeneity in loan mods between securitized and portfolio loans.
The difficulty in doing principal reduction mods for securitized loans is quite important because to the extent that negative equity is driving foreclosures (and there is significant evidence that it is), principal reduction modifications are the tool for eliminating negative equity (with an shared appreciation clawback or not).  The quality of loan modifications matters, and securitization affect the quality.
There is also a major difference in the ability of portfolio lenders and Fannie/Freddie/Ginnie servicers to extend the term of a mortgage that private-label servicers don’t have.  Not all securitization is the same.   Private label servicers can usually stretch out the term of a loan by no more than a year or so because the servicing contracts prohibit the extension of the term beyond the last maturity date of any loan in the pool, and pools are usually of similar vintage and duration loans.  Fannie/Freddie/Ginnie loans can be bought out of a pool and modified, making them more like portfolio in this regard.  Thus 49.2% of portfolio loan mods, 50.8% of Fannie, 61.2% of Freddie, and 17.2% of Ginnie mods involved term extensions, but only 3.9% of private-label securitization mods.
Quite likely there is other heterogeneity that cannot be as easily discerned.  This makes sense–portfolio lenders are much less constrained in modifications than securitization servicers.  Attempts to quantify servicers’ constraints by looking at contract language are inherently limited, as there are structural and functional constraints that are not apparent from an examination of the face of the servicing agreements. Moreover, securitization servicers are adverse to principal write-downs because that affects their compensation far more than an interest rate reduction.  The agency problem just doesn’t exist for portfolio loans.

Finally, the study has a very strange observation that there is a moral hazard problem in principal balance reductions, but apparently not for interest rate reductions:  “Balance reductions are appealing to both borrowers in danger of default and those who are not.”  Therefore, borrowers might default to get principal reductions.  Sure, that’s right, but everyone would also like a lower interest rate too.  I don’t see why a principal reduction presents a different level of moral hazard from an interest rate reduction.  In terms of net present value, principal and interest rate are interchangeable (yes, there’s an interest deduction, and a principal reduction changes the ability to refinance, but that’s not the distinction at issue).  The bigger factor pushing against principal reductions (other than servicer compensation) is an accounting issue.  A principal reduction shows up on the balance sheet immediately.  A reduction of interest just reduces future income.

The take-away here is that even if the Boston Fed staff is right that securitization doesn’t affect the prevalence of loan modifications, it clearly affects the quality of those modifications, and that is every bit as important, not least because the performance of past modifications is the basis for servicers’ calculation of the redefault risk that the Boston Fed staff emphasizes as constraining modifications.  If servicers do bad mods and have high redefaults, that will make them more adverse to doing mods in the future because they will think that the mods don’t work.

July 22, 2009 at 12:57 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (9)

Is Redefault Risk Preventing Mortgage Loan Mods?

posted by Adam Levitin

There’s a very interesting new study on mortgage loan modifications out from the Boston Federal Reserve staff.  This sort of study is long-overdue and from an academic standpoint, there’s a lot I really like about this study.  But the study is going to get a lot of policy attention, and I think it’s important to point out some of the problems with the study that limit its ability to serve as a policy guide.

Continue reading “Is Redefault Risk Preventing Mortgage Loan Mods? ” »

July 16, 2009 at 2:03 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (19)

Skin in the Game

posted by Adam Levitin

The proposed skin-in-the-game requirement for securitization strikes me as misguided, no matter how its structured. Different industries use securitization for different purposes, and while skin in the game might not have much of an impact in some, it runs contrary to the (legitimate) purposes of securitization in others.

Some industries securitize primarily to gain off-balance sheet and immediate revenue-booking accounting benefits and because it is a cheaper funding source than other methods. Industries like these often have significant skin in the game (e.g., the credit card industry, where a 7% vertical slice is the typical minimum requirement and it’s usually much higher). Other industries, like non-GSE mortgages securitize primarily to shift credit risk. The whole point of securitization is not to have skin in the game.The skin in the game requirement is being driven by the experience in mortgage securitization, not other types of securitization, and imposing a skin in the game requirement probably won’t do much to non-mortgage securitization, where there might already be more than 5% retained interest. But for housing finance, skin in the game is really counter productive. 

Continue reading “Skin in the Game” »

AP Launches the Economic Stress Index

posted by Bob Lawless

The Associated Press has launched the Economic Stress Index. Credit Slips readers will find it very useful and interesting. For a dataphile like myself, it’s just plain cool. OK, it’s not cool at all because it shows the tremendous depth and breadth of middle America’s suffering. But, it shows what someone with real data know-how and computer graphic skills can do.

The Economic Stress Index “weighs three economic variables — unemployment, foreclosures and bankruptcy — to produce a score on a scale of 0-100 that measures how the recession is affecting a county compared to all others.” You can scroll over each county and get a separate measure for each of the components or for the composite Economic Stress Index. The press release indicates the index and data will be updated monthly. Check it out.

Does Anybody Know If Credit or Foreclosure Counseling Helps?

posted by David Lander

The infusion of millions of dollars to pay “counselors” to forestall foreclosures on behalf of consumers who are delinquent on their mortgage payments seems as American as apple pie and should perhaps help some homeowners. These dollars are split among neighborhood non profits, specialized housing counseling organizations and a considerable amount has flowed to providers that have historically spent most of their time counseling consumers with credit card delinquencies. A group of United Way supported family and children service agencies also receive some of these funds.

Anecdotal reports indicate that the housing counselors are a cut above the historic credit card counselors. The credit card counseling industry agencies were mostly begun by creditors and their funding has always been supported by payments from creditors. The housing counseling organizations began with funds from HUD and the Ford Foundation and the extensive new dollars have come from the Federal government through a central organization called Neighbor Works. The neighborhood organizations obtain their funding all over the lot. The cultures of the various organizations differ a good deal among themselves and between the various types of providers.

Continue reading “Does Anybody Know If Credit or Foreclosure Counseling Helps? ” »

Mortgage Modification Vote in Senate

posted by Bob Lawless

Credit Slips has featured a lot of articles about a legislative proposal to give bankruptcy judges the power to modify home mortgages in chapter 13 (here, here, here, here, and here for a just a few examples). Heck, we were blogging about back this idea back in 2007. In March, the House passed H.R. 1106, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which would enact this proposal into law. Since then, it has faced an uncertain future in the Senate. Yesterday, CongressDaily reported that Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid will bring the mortgage modification proposal for a floor vote in the Senate. Although this might seem like good news for supporters of the legislation, close observers of the political scene seem to be predicting defeat. Two Democratic Senators (Ben Nelson of Nebraska and Jon Tester of Montana) and Republican Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee are quoted in the CongressDaily article as being against the legislation, with Corker going so far as to say “Cram-down is dead.”

If you support the legislation, however, now would be a good time to tell that to your senators — or, in the case of Minnesota, senator. It’s not over until the fat lady lets the horses out of the barn.

Mortgage Symposium at Pepperdine

posted by Bob Lawless

On Friday, Pepperdine University School of Law is hosting a symposium entitled, “Bringing Down the Curtain on the Current Mortgage Crisis and Preventing a Return Engagement.” As the announcement notes, the Pepperdine Law Review is bringing top scholars and Bob Lawless to campus. OK, it doesn’t actually say that explicitly, but I’ve always wanted such an announcement to say something like that. Besides myself, the speakers include Ann Burkhart, Rick Caruso, Deborah Dakin, Wilson Freyermuth, Sam Gerdano, Melissa Jacoby, Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Timothy Mayopoulos, Grant Nelson, Mark Scarberry, and Dale Whitman. Truly trivial question: which four were once colleagues at the University of Missouri School of Law?

The papers will be published in the Pepperdine Law Review. My contribution has been co-authored by my research assistant extraordinaire, Jeff Paulsen. Before he goes off for a two-year clerkship with Judge Jack Schmetterer in the bankruptcy court in Chicago, I wanted to take advantage of his talent work with Jeff on a scholarly piece. We have a working title of “The Missing History of Bankruptcy Mortgage Modification.” The short version is that the current rule against modifying mortgages in bankruptcy is not the considered policy choice as it is often portrayed. Rather, like many things, the history is much messier, and path dependence explains a lot of it. When we have a version for SSRN, I’ll post a more detailed summary.

How to Start to Get Trillions in Lost Wealth Back

posted by Christian E. Weller

The fact that wealth is rapidly declining deserves public policy attention. Wealth serves critical functions in the U.S. economy that relies heavily on individual initiative. It is primarily an insurance against a range of economic risks. The more such insurance exists for the typical family, the less a family has to worry about their basic necessities and the more they can focus on longer-term economic growth. A family that has the basics covered can take more chances by sending their kids to college and letting them choose a degree that suits their abilities. Also, family members can more easily switch jobs to match their particular skills. And, a family with enough wealth is in a better position to let their creative side take hold and start a business. The entire economy wins from letting people gain more skills and apply those skills most effectively in their job or by starting a business.

Recommending what the government should and should not do about rebuilding family wealth has become as ubiquitous as real estate ads in the mid-2000s and dot-com IPO discussions in the late 1990s. Here are just a few principles that will likely guide the reform debate.

Continue reading “How to Start to Get Trillions in Lost Wealth Back” »

Our House in the Middle of Our Street is no Longer Our House

posted by Christian E. Weller

Here’s a news flash: The housing market is bad. Actually, it is really bad, historically, woefully bad. And, the bad news won’t stop coming. Housing wealth is dropping precipitously, families own ever smaller shares of their own homes, and home owners are falling behind in their mortgages in record numbers.

According to data from the Federal Reserve, housing wealth has taken a nose dive for two years. In December 2006, housing values reached a peak of $18.9 trillion (in 2008 dollars). By December 2008, they had fallen by $3.9 trillion to $15.1 trillion.

This reflects a historically fast depreciation of housing wealth. Over the past two years, real housing wealth dropped by 20.5%, a record for any two-year period since 1952. In fact, before this crisis occurred, there had never been a two-year period when real housing value fell by more than six percent.

Continue reading “Our House in the Middle of Our Street is no Longer Our House” »

Great New Reading on Mortgage Modification

posted by Jason Kilborn

It’s not all just fun and games with old credit cards at Katie Porter’s house!  She and a couple of co-authors have a great new paper on SSRN describing the history of the anti-modification provision for principal residence mortgages, an empirical study of home mortgage burdens in Chapter 13 plans, and some comments on how reasonable forced modifications of those burdens could save not only these folks’ homes, but Chapter 13 in general.  This had not occurred to me (I admit), but the 66% failure rate for Chapter 13 plans must be in large part explained by the burden of bloated mortgage obligations. Katie’s paper more or less confirms this suspicion empirically. Reducing that burden to a reasonable level would therefore not only help people to stay in their homes, but it could result in a much higher plan-completion rate in Chapter 13 generally. This would be a great double-whammy. The paper deserves a close look by anyone interested in this hot topic.

In other related news, another CreditSlips blogger has released a particularly high-profile paper on the subject of addressing mortgage foreclosure woes. Elizabeth Warren heads the Congressional Oversight Panel looking into foreclosure mitigation practices, and the panel released its report last Friday. I can only assume the report was authored in large part by Elizabeth–it has the tell-tale signs of her incredibly lucid and incisive writing style, backed up by a wealth of empirical knowledge about how struggling with mortgages and other debts really looks in practice. Check it out!

March 11, 2009 at 11:37 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Congressional Oversight Panel Foreclosure Report

posted by Adam Levitin

The Congressional Oversight Panel‘s foreclosure report will be out tomorrow.  I’m hoping it advances the discussion on foreclosures and foreclosure mitigation efforts and helps focus what is still a rather amorphous debate in which there seems to be too little common ground.

March 5, 2009 at 6:00 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (4)

Bankruptcy Bill Passes in the House

posted by Adam Levitin

H.R. 1106, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which will allow modification of all types of mortgages in Chapter 13 bankruptcy, passed the House today by a vote of 234-191.

I haven’t found a link yet with the vote breakdown or any other details, but will post more when I do. 

March 5, 2009 at 5:56 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Bankruptcy Mortgage Modification Getting More Attention

posted by Bob Lawless

You know the steam is starting to pick up for the horses to close the barn door before the barn burns done while we’re counting our chickens when …. let me try that again.

Bankruptcy mortgage modification is moving beyond the specialty blogs such as this. David Abromowitz over at The Huffington Post has a post up advocating passage of a bankruptcy mortgage modification bill. I’m hoping the fact that the bill is getting broader attention means the train is about to sail.

BS Bankruptcy Numbers

posted by Adam Levitin

We’ve already seen a lot of bs numbers in the cramdown debate. The Mortgage Bankers Association keeps pushing its ridiculous figures. And now Todd Zywicki has joined the fray with an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal a couple of weeks ago.

Professor Zywicki that claimed that “A recent staff report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimated a 265 basis-point reduction on average in auto loan terms as a result of the reform.”

One little problem. That’s not what the Fed staff report found. Professor Zywicki was off by 250 basis points (a doozy of a mistake!), as well inserting a causal link not supported (and arguably contradicted) by the Fed staff’s study. The study states that “The decline in the average auto loan spread was 15 basis points lower after BAR for unlimited exemption states, a 5.7 percent decline relative to the mean over all states (265 basis points).” In other words, the average rate spread is 265 bp. The decline in rates, to which Zywicki was referring was only 15bp, and that was only in states with an unlimited homestead exemption.  That it was not 265 bp was abundantly clear from the regression tables.

But that’s not all. It’s not as if Professor Zywicki simply mistook a 15 bp drop for a 265 bp drop.  That 15 bp isn’t what it appears to be.  The study used two statistical specifications and looked at states with limited and states with unlimited homestead exemption to see what impact there was on auto loan rates post-BAPCPA, which enacted an anti-auto cramdown provision (the infamous “hanging paragraph” that says that there’s no bifurcation of claims for cars purchased primarily for personal use in the previous 910 days).

In one specification it found nothing with statistical significance regardless of the homestead exemption level, which means that it couldn’t rule out the possibility that the change in rates was random.

In the other specification, post-BAPCPA there was a marginally statistically significant 15 bp drop in five-year auto loan rates in states with unlimited homestead exemptions. There was no statistical significance in the drop in other states. What’s funny about this is that homestead exemptions have no bearing in Chapter 13–exemptions are only available in Chapter 7. So if the study had aggregated all states for its regression, it seems unlikely that it would have gotten stronger statistical significance.

So we have at best very weak evidence of a 15bp drop in rates. But it doesn’t follow that the drop was due to the anti-auto-cramdown provision. The study also found a significant decline in auto-loan delinquencies in the short period after BAPCPA. The most plausible story, I think, is that surge in bankruptcy filings before BAPCPA’s effective date cleared out the pipeline of troubled loans so that post-BAPCPA auto loan default rates were lower. My guess is that they’ve climbed right back up.  Notice that this has nothing to do with cramdown. This has to do with moving forward some filings that would have happened later. So we have a 15bp drop that might not even be statistically significant and only in some specifications and only for states with unlimited homestead exemptions, and it probably isn’t attributable (or at least most of it) to the anti-cramdown provision, but instead to BAPCPA causing a filing pile-up. So where did Professor Zywicki get this 265 basis point number from? That’s the spread that exists between five year auto loans and five year Treasuries. It has nothing to do with bankruptcy.

Sometimes a little common sense is needed when looking at numbers, too. In December 2005, auto loan rates were at around 6.63% (663 bp). If 265 bp was right, it would have been a 40% decrease in auto loan rates! Whatever impact bankruptcy has on credit costs, I don’t think there’s anyone who could honestly argue that 40% of the cost of auto loans is due to the ability to cram down loans on cars purchased primarily for personal use within the previous 910-days with a purchase money security interest. There just aren’t that many folks filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, much less who fit into this particular set of circumstances, to have this kind of impact on pricing, regardless of the loss severities.

Yet another case of baloney numbers shaping the bankruptcy debate. I hope the WSJ runs a correction on this.  Now there’s some fact-checking for you.

[Update 3.6.09: Based on correspondence with Don Morgan, one of the NY Fed study’s authors and Professor Zywicki, a few new points emerge:

First, I misread the study too.  The 15bp finding is in a regression that measure the “difference-in-differences” in the spread between auto loans and Treasuries pre- and post-BAPCPA for states with and without unlimited homestead exemptions.  The study does not report the post-BAPCPA rate drop in auto loan rates.  The author, however, tells me that it turns out to be 46-56 bps, and to have strong statistical significance. So let the record stand corrected on this.

Second, regardless of whether the number is 15, 46, 56, or 265bps, the finding of a correlation does not mean there’s causation.  But that’s precisely what Professor Zywicki was pushing in the WSJ.   Unfortunately, it’s just not a tenable claim.

It’s possible that BAPCPA resulted in lower auto loan rates.  But in order to make a reasonable causation argument, one must first explain the similar or larger rate drops in 2000-2001 and in 2003 and in 2007 that have nothing to do with BAPCPA.  Otherwise, the causal argument is reduced to the fallacious post hoc ergo propter hoc variety.

The chart below, taken from the NY Fed study shows with the solid and dotted lines the spread between auto loan rates and Treasury’s for states with and states without unlimited homestead exemptions.  They move in sync, and they clearly fall after BAPCPA.  But they also fall equally sharply before and after BAPCPA.  Auto loan rate spreads over Treasury jump around a lot, and the mere fact that they fell after BAPCPA doesn’t prove anything.

(fwiw, Chart 5 appears to be incorrectly labelled in the study.  The study says that the Left axis measures interest rate on new automobile loan (5 year) minus rate on government bond (5 year).” If so, then 15bps would appear to be roughly the right measure.  Instead, the rate spread must be the right axis in bps, and the left axis must be measuring the difference in the auto-loan-treasury spread between limited and unlimited homestead exemption states.)

The problems with Professor Zywicki’s causality argument don’t end there.  Any causality argument must also distinguish between general impacts of BAPCPA (e.g, delinquency pipeline cleared out) and the auto-cramdown provision.  This type of event study cannot provide support for that.  The rate drop could be due to the hanging paragraph, but there’s no responsible way to make that claim without addressing these other factors, and the NY Fed study doesn’t attempt to do that. The fact that Professor Zywicki was off by 209-219 bps, rather than by a full 250 bps (something he couldn’t have known from the study) doesn’t absolve him of making an untenable causal claim.

The  bankruptcy policy debate should happen on the basis of the best possible evidence.  If more restrictive bankruptcy laws result in cheaper credit, that’s a very important policy consideration, and for the integrity of the policy debate, we need to be working off the best numbers available. I’ve updated this post to make sure that the correct numbers are clear.  I’m still hopeful that Professor Zywicki will make clear that he doesn’t stand by either his 265 bp claim or his untenable claim of causality.]

[Updated 3.7.09

Professor Zywicki has corrected on the 265 bp claim.  He still seems to be making causal assertions, however, such as that the study finds “the impact of eliminating cramdown was a reduction in interest rates of 56 or 46 basis points.”  That’s not quite right.  The study can’t test the elimination of cramdown; it can only test the impact of BAPCPA as a whole.  In fairness, Zywicki later refers to the study finding the impact of BAPCPA, rather than the specific cramdown provision.  Regardless, Professor Zywicki still has no response to all of the equally large jumps up and down in the auto loan rate to Treasuries before and after BAPCPA, which casts serious doubt on any causal story.]

A Note on Notes

posted by Bob Lawless

When you’re in court, you have to provide evidence of your case. When you’re a creditor, that proof includes the fact the debtor owes the money due and should include the contract (the “note” in legalese) that the debtor signed. Bankruptcy specialists have been following this issue for a while now, and it has made its way into the New York Times today in Gretchen Morgenson’s column. I recommend it as a read. And, congrats to Judge Sam Bufford and attorney R. Glen Ayers for their mention in the column. It’s not often that a paper prepared for a professional meeting ends up in the New York Times, but they accomplished just that with a paper on the somewhat arcane rules that govern proof in such matters.

H/T to reader Mike Dillon for bringing the article to my attentiion.

March 1, 2009 at 5:30 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (1)

Responding to Schwartz on Mortgage Modification

posted by Bob Lawless

Professor Alan Schwartz of Yale University has an op-ed in today’s New York Times arguing against the proposals to give bankruptcy judges the power to modify home mortgages. For our readers who do not know him, Professor Schwartz is a respected academic and bankruptcy expert, but with all due respect, I think he just gets this wrong. He makes three principal points, but none of them are a good reason not to move forward with this much-needed legislation.

First, Schwartz says that the proposal would swamp the bankruptcy courts and the nation’s 300 bankruptcy judges. That seems empirically dubious given that my forecast of 1.4 million filings this year is below the number of filings in 2002 – 2004, when the annual filing rate was around 1.6 million filings and we had about the same number of bankruptcy judges. Even if the mortgage modification bill resulted in hundreds of thousands of extra filings in the short term, we still would be below the 2 million bankruptcy cases in 2005 when filings surged ahead of the draconian new bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy system survived those filing levels and should handle any increases that would come from mortgage modification.

Continue reading “Responding to Schwartz on Mortgage Modification” »

Waiting for H.R. 1106 (a.k.a. H.R. 200/S. 61)

posted by Jason Kilborn

The comment thread from the previous post raises an important point that deserves treatment in its own post: what’s the deal with the House version of the mortgage lien stripping bill (H.R. 1106), a vote on which has been postponed due to fears from pushback from “Blue Dog” and “new” Democrats.

First, my two cents: I believe (1) limiting application of this relief to property “that is the subject of a notice that a foreclosure may be commenced” is foolishly short-sighted and a significant restriction that has not gotten much press, but (2) relieving these folks of the idiocy of pre-filing credit counseling is to be roundly praised (perhaps we can be rid of this requirement for all filers in the not-too-distant future, as Sweden did in its 2007 reform of consumer bankruptcy law), (3) the balance of interests is impressive and eminently fair, allowing for reasonable modification of interest rates, extension of repayment term, and a reasonable strip-down of the secured claim, but also allowing for recapture of a declining portion of that loss if values rebound and the home is sold for a profit within 5 years. The big question will be valuation, and I fully expect the banks to push back hard on that question in any future case, probably irrationally, as I’ve complained elsewhere. As usual in bankruptcy discussions, people just don’t get that this law doesn’t create losses, it forces banks to acknowledge already existing losses, which is an important prerequisite to getting us out of this financial crisis. Banks’ arguments that this law will reduce lending are subject to only two appropriate responses, in my view: if banks reduce lending in response to this law, that would indicate either (1) yet more irrational mismanagement by banks, which makes me feel like nationalization of the home mortgage industry is a more attractive option, along the lines of the full nationalization of the student lending industry in President Obama’s budget proposal, or (2) a proper reevaluation of the risk of lending to uncreditworthy borrowers–forcing the banks to engage in the sort of responsible risk management that was needed all along. Heads we win, tails we win. The only losers here are irresponsible banks, who deserve to lose given their mismanagement, and they should no longer be allowed to externalize the negative consequences of their mistakes onto debtors, their families and communities, and society at large. Internalizing negative externalities from irrational creditor action is the primary reason why country after country in Europe adopted consumer bankruptcy systems in the 1980s and 1990s, as I’m writing in an article on the Danish system now.

Second, though I hope and expect this bill will pass next week, the “Blue Dog” Democrats appear to have fallen prey to the Jedi mind tricks of the lending industry lobbying juggernaut. This reminds me of a portion of the late 1980s Eddie Murphy Raw monologue, in which Eddie recounts an exchange with Mr. T. Eddie explains that he had been making fun of Mr. T in an earlier monologue and was accosted by Mr. T when Mr. T found out about this: “I heard you been saying @#$% about me,” Mr. T accused. Eddie explains in Raw that, fearing reprisal from impressively scary Mr. T, he decided to use his “Jedi mind trick”: he responded calmly, “It wasn’t me.” When Mr. T retorted that he had heard Eddie saying these things about him, Eddie simply repeated, “It wasn’t me.” Finally, Mr. T conceded, “Well, well . . . I guess it wasn’t you. I pity the fool who’s been telling me them lies!” The Bankers Association apparently saw Raw and has effectively applied Murphy’s Jedi mind trick on the Blue Dog Democrats (no offense is intended to Mr. T through my comparison between him the weak-minded Blue Dogs).

Comments are wide open–what do you think about H.R. 1106?

February 27, 2009 at 11:29 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (14)

Mortgage Database

posted by Katie Porter

The National Mortgage Data Repository is making its data available to a select group of applicants to conduct mortgage resarch. The Repository is a joint project of the National Consumer Law Center and the University of Connecticut School of Lawand includes data from 750 loans made in 10-15 states between 1994 and 2007. While the database isn’t as comprehensive as HMDA or Loan Performance, it has a unique collection of data and the data are free. For each loan, the researchers have gathered the loan application, the truth in lending disclosure, the good faith estimate, the HUD-1 Settlement Statement, and the loan note. These are the core documents in a mortgage origination, making this a great dataset to study the costs of mortgage credit and underwriting decisions.

Research proposals of 2 single-spaced pages are due by March 31, 2009. Submissions are welcome not only from academics but also from advocates, attorneys, and other professionals interested in mortgage issues. (Having teamed up with guest blogger Tara Twomey for our Mortgage Studyof bankruptcy and homeownership, I encourage my scholarly colleagues to consider the many virtues of collaborating on research with attorney/practitioners). Authors whose projects are selected will present their work at a symposium in Spring 2010 at Valparaiso University School of Law. The full call for papers is here: Download Investigating Lender Practices in the Subprime Mortgage Market . Thanks to former guest blogger Pat McCoy for sharing this opportunity with Credit Slips.

Some Good News for Homeowners

posted by Angie Littwin

JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup have announced a weeks-long moratorium on foreclosures while they await the release of the Obama administration’s forthcoming plan to deal with the issue. J.P. Morgan said its moratorium will apply to loans it owns and services, while Citi is including its own loans as well as those on which it has reached agreements with the relevant investors. For both banks, this is an expansion on similar past efforts. It remains to be seen exactly how many troubled home loans this will cover.

February 13, 2009 at 1:46 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack (0)

What a Surprise, the Ability to Pay Matters on Mortgage Modifications, Too.

posted by Kathleen Keest

Last week the Center for Responsible Lending posted a foreclosure ticker on its web site that counts projected new foreclosure filings as they occur: a new one every 13 seconds in 2009.  That puts it at nearly 276,000 as I write this post.  (You can check out your state’s share on the map.)

Cool as technology is, the figures are as depressing as the slow pace of response to the crisis is puzzling. In a December guest blog,  Tara Twomey lifted the veil on the OCC’s report of disappointing re-default rates on modification.  Professor Alan White’s analysis of remittance reports from loan servicers found that only 35% of modifications reduced the homeowner’s monthly payment, while 20% stayed the same.  The largest share– 45%–actually increased payments.

Yesterday, Fitch Ratings released a report that says (you heard it here first) “the key to a successful loan modification program is that the modification is sustainable.” The modifications with 10-20% increases in principal and interest (P&I) payments had a 49% re-default rate within 6 months, more than double the re-default rate for modifications to a 20% or greater reduction in P&I payment (21%). Imagine that!

The Fitch report notes that payment reduction, at least so far, has a more direct impact on re-default than principal reduction. (They also, though, believe principal reductions that give homeowners equity are also likely to improve sustainability.) Fitch projects a high rate of re-defaults unless servicers start focusing more on – (ahem) – long-term ability to pay.

Seems that we’ve come full circle: Hey, guys, maybe you should think about whether people can make the payments when you originate the loan. Hey, guys, maybe you should think about whether they can make the payments when you try to fix the loan.

Should it really be this hard?

February 11, 2009 at 9:05 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (12)

Mortgage Servicing Problems for Prepayments

posted by Adam Levitin

With all the problems in the mortgage industry caused by defaults, it’s easy to forget that the traditional bugbear of mortgage lenders isn’t credit risk, but prepayment risk.  If a lender contracted for a 6% return and the loan is prepaid, there’s a chance that the best return the lender can get now is say 4.5%.

As it turns out, prepayments can cause just as many problems for servicers as defaults.  Recently, one of my relatives laid into me with this story about her problems getting her servicer to correctly credit her prepayments.  The servicer has been crediting them all to interest, not to principal, so the loan balance isn’t getting paid down (and the servicer is making more money that way, at the expense of the investors).  What’s worse, is that the servicer says it can’t correct the problem because some of the prepayments were made before it acquired the servicing rights.  And, the servicer says that if it corrected the problem, it would result in the account being listed as 30-days late and credit reported because the servicer did not make an automatic withdrawal one month because it treated the prepayment as a regular (but partial) payment (even though the total prepayments should put the loan way ahead on its original amortization schedule).

Put another way, the servicer is saying that they cannot produce an accurate payoff balanceand that if the homeowner demands one it will result in her being credit-reported incorrectly.

This aggrevating situation illuminates what a mess the mortgage servicing world is in.  For all of the attention justly paid to mortgage servicing problems with defaulted homeowners and servicing fraud in the context of default, my relative’s case makes me wonder whether the rot in the servicing industry extends all the way up the tree, to an inability to properly handle transferred servicing rights and an inability to properly handle prepayments.

And here’s the real problem: consumers trust financial institution creditors to be competent and fair.  They trust that balances are right, that APRs are properly applied, that amortization schedules are correct, etc.  Without that trust, the entire system of financial intermediation cannot work.  Financial institutions trade in trust.  Absent that trust, every consumer would have to subject every credit card bill, auto loan bill, mortgage bill, and student loan bill, etc. to a forensic accounting.  That would be astonishingly inefficient.  We shouldn’t want consumers to have to be so careful.  It’s one thing to expect consumers to look at their bills to make sure that there are no unauthorized line items.  It’s another to expect them to run interest and amortization calculations.

For the most part the system works, as it’s all highly automated.  But when it doesn’t, the power imbalance between the financial institution and the consumer puts the consumer at a serious disadvantage.  We really need a better system for resolving consumer disputes with financial institutions.  I’m not sure what it is, but maybe the trick is to avoid the disputes by making sure the FIs get things right. The least cost avoider of the errors is the financial institution, and we should really have stronger incentives for FIs to get it right.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of Mortgage Servicing and Implications for Mortgage Modification

posted by Jean Braucher

It looks as if the mortgage cramdown–er, modification–legislation will be sitting around for a while, at least until the stimulus package gets through Congress. So it seems worth talking about its reference to making “payments of such modified loan directly to the holder of the claim” instead of through the Chapter 13 trustee. Although this language was still in the manager’s version of the bill (H.R. 200) as of last week, apparently discussions continue in Washington about whether this is the best policy approach.

A big reason for needing trustees in the picture is to keep track of mortgage payments, because servicers make a lot of errors. There are apparently new servicing companies that are trying to avoid the problems that have been rampant in the industry in the past—dare we hope that some good servicers are coming on line? But no doubt there are still many of the bad (careless) and the ugly (those who are deliberately charging unreasonable or illegal fees during bankruptcy). I’d be interested to hear whether anyone is seeing improvement in this industry since the new focus on its shortcomings.

As a policy matter, the argument for payment of mortgage obligations through the Chapter 13 trustee, rather than directly, is that this approach likely makes it easier for debtors to complete their plans and keep their homes without an expensive fight at the end about whether they are up to date on payments. Putting Chapter 13 trustees in charge of disbursements gives debtors the benefit of their superior record-keeping ability and understanding and their leverage with servicers because of their continuing relationships. While lawyers in areas that have not had a practice of conduit payment of regular mortgage amounts through the trustee often oppose that approach on the assumption that trustee fees will make plans infeasible, the evidence seems to be that conduit payments result in the percentage fee going down. Most trustees already top out on the compensation they are allowed by law. Lower percentage fees in conduit trusteeships may mean that most debtors do not have a problem with feasibility, although unsecured creditors may get paid less. There may be some debtors at the margin who won’t be able to afford a plan if they have to pay trustee fees, but courts could make exceptions in such cases on feasibility grounds (feasibility can cut in different directions depending on the case).

Continue reading “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly of Mortgage Servicing and Implications for Mortgage Modification” »

February 4, 2009 at 6:19 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (13)

What’s in a word (or 2?) Cramdown

posted by Katie Porter

Last Sunday’s New York Times Magazine’s feature, On Language, discussed the etymology and signification of the word “cramdown.” (Or is it “cram down?” That’s a separate debate that professors have with law review editors every year).

William Safire observes that cramdown is coming into popular parlance as bankruptcy becomes an everday topic and the debate continues about the mortgage modification legislation. Credit Slips guestblogger, the Honorable Eugene Wedoff, found a use of the term in a 1948 law review article and a 1944 judicial opinion. The term has a general use as a verb to indicate forcing unwanted treatment on creditors. In today’s bankruptcy context, the term refers to at least two specific types of such treatment: 1) reducing a creditor’s secured claim to the value of the collateral and 2) confirming a chapter 11 plan over the objection of a class of dissenting creditors. Law students often become confused when their professors use the terms in these two different contexts. I try to use cramdown only to mean the chapter 11 voting override provision and instead speak of “lien stripping” to refer to the writedown of a secured claim under section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Of course, lien stripping is a misnomer, since the the lien remains on the collateral and should not be confused with lien avoidance. What is being “stripped” in part is the value of the claim.)

Safire suggests that the ugly connotations of the word cramdown may be hindering legislative efforts to pass mortgage modification. Senator Durbin’s spokesman said that the appropriate term to describe his proposed legislation is “judicial modification.” While not as colorful as cramdown, it has the virtue of reminding people that a write down in principal is NOT the only feature, and may not even be the most beneficial or widely used feature, of the legislation. Depending on property values where you live, when you bought your house, the type of loan, and future interest rates, debtors may find reductions in interest rate or reamortizations of their loans to be more helpful in reducing their monthly payments and avoiding foreclosure. Using cramdown as shorthand to describe the bill gives short shrift to its potential benefits when all the term may invoke for many people is the specific ability to reduce a mortgage to the value of a house.

Mortgage Cramdown–Layering On Complexity

posted by Jean Braucher

Chapter 13 is already too complicated, and cramdown legislation will make it more so and lead to a new round of litigation and expense that will stand in the way of keeping people in their homes. By all means, Congress should enact mortgage cramdown, but it should take up bankruptcy simplification immediately after that if it really wants people to hold on to their homes in chapter 13.

Katie Porter has already noted the problem of high noncompletion rates in chapter 13 as a reason for suspecting that mortgage cramdown will not “save” many homes. See Cramdown Controversy #2–Will I “Succeed?” The problem is that the impact of the pending cramdown legislation could be small given the messy state of bankruptcy law since the 2005 changes.

The 2005 law has substantially increased the expense of bankruptcy, deterring and delaying its use among the worst off. The chapter 13 filing fee has gone up to $274.  “No look” attorneys’ fees of at least $3,000 are the norm in chapter 13 (see http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf at 25-26), and this is a bargain price considering what lawyers are expected to do under the new law.

Mortgage cramdown will add the difficulty of a valuation hearing, with experts engaging in a swearing contest about the value of a home for which, in many cases, there currently is no market. Cars have various “book” values that can be used to set default measures of value in bankruptcy, but there is no similar simple approach to valuing homes to save on litigation costs.

The bills add a lot of complexity of various sorts. S. 61 and H.R. 200 both would layer on a ridiculous, unnecessary third “good faith” test in chapter 13. The debtor already must file in good faith and propose a plan in good faith, yet the bill’s drafters felt compelled to add an additional requirement that the modification be in good faith. This would stoke litigation over whether it is bad faith to pay the value of the home if the debtor could “afford” more (“afford” always being a malleable concept), with an open question about what other expenses should be taken into account when deciding what the debtor has available to pay for an underwater home.

It would be much better for Congress to explicitly state what it wants—for example, whether just paying the home’s value is fine, with excess disposable income (if any) going to other secured debts (such as cars) and then unsecured debts.  Furthermore, it would be a good idea for Congress to state that if home and car payments use up all the available income over regular expenses, it is not “bad faith” to pay zero to unsecured creditors.  Congress should be heading off the inevitable arguments that just paying for collateral in chapter 13 is not good faith.  If chapter 13 is going to be a mechanism to save homes from foreclosure, many debtors will have nothing left to pay old unsecured debts.  Unfortunately, some judges and trustees have used a good faith test to push for rule-of-thumb amounts of unsecured debt repayment in chapter 13 whether or not that is feasible, contributing to a high noncompletion rate (historically, about two-thirds of chapter 13 cases).

I agree with Katie Porter that the provision in the bills for direct payments by debtors to claim holders is a mistake.  It is unclear whether this would always be required, or whether this language just gives courts discretion to allow direct payment.  In most cases, Chapter 13 trustees are needed to make sure that payments actually get credited appropriately to debtors’ accounts.  If the problem is feasibility of plans due to paying trustee fees on mortgage amounts, Congress could provide for a lower trustee fee on those payments. Without the trustees involved in record-keeping, debtors will face huge cost and difficulty at case closing to try to show that they really are current on their mortgages.  Most trustees now make it a default practice that mortgage payments be made through them, and this has saved on trouble for debtors, trustees and judges.

Another aspect of the bills that is troublesome is that the debtor must have already received a notice of foreclosure in order to cramdown.  This prevents debtors from taking charge of a hopeless situation and getting it resolved; they would have to wait for the lender to send a foreclosure notice before they could make use of chapter 13 to modify their mortgages.

The elimination of credit counseling for debtors who have received a notice of foreclosure is a step in the right direction, but if Congress paid attention to GAO reports, it would repeal the credit counseling requirement entirely. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07778t.pdf It represents a cost in money ($50 per debtor) and inconvenience way in excess of very minimal benefit.

Mortgage cramdown would also add to the complexity of other issues currently making their way through the appellate system, particularly issues concerning means testing and treatment of car loans.  (For more discussion of these issues, see my recent paper, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1307250.)

Means testing allows above-median-income debtors in either chapter 7 or chapter 13 to include their secured debt obligations as part of their expenses, yet with cramdown on a home possible, the debtor might not have to pay the full secured debt in chapter 13.  This will lead to a new round of litigation over additional layers of means testing, whether under the “good faith” or “totality of the circumstances” tests in chapter 7 or the “projected disposable income” or various “good faith” tests in chapter 13 when the debtor might be able to cramdown.

And then there will be the ironies of allowing cramdown on underwater home mortgages while perhaps not allowing cramdown on seriously underwater car loans, particularly the most risky subprime ones.  If the car lender rolled in a big wad of debt from the last car (known as “negative equity”), making the debt severely undersecured from the outset, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to treat that debt as fully secured under the “hanging paragraph” while cramming down a similarly undersecured home loan.  I am among those who think it is ridiculous—both as a matter of law (see http://www.nacba.org/s/45_50fc1f2acc4e329/files/PeasleeSupportBrief.pdf) and policy—to treat paying off your last car as part of the purchase money for your next one. As a policy matter, this is very risky credit, and it does not deserve preferred status (disallowing cramdown).

All this is to suggest that we desperately need a fresh start for bankruptcy reform, and layering mortgage cramdown on the 2005 mess will just make this more apparent.  The complexity of the law stands in the way of its use at an affordable price and makes it hard to mobilize the bankruptcy system for this crisis.

January 26, 2009 at 12:31 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (16)

Bankruptcy Modification and the Emperor’s New Clothes

posted by Adam Levitin

A new argument being advanced against bankruptcy modification is that it will result in trillions of dollars of losses and the collapse of the financial system.  This is the “the sky will fall” argument.

Leaving aside the grossly inflated numbers, let’s be really clear that these are not losses that would be caused by bankruptcy modification.  These losses exist with or without bankruptcy modification.  All bankruptcy modification does is force these losses to be recognized now, rather than at some point down the road.  Bankruptcy modification doesn’t change the underlying insolvency of many financial institutions.  One way or another, there are a lot of financial institutions that have to be recapitalized.
Financial institutions want to delay loss recognition as long as possible.  Maybe they’re hoping that the market will magically rebound.  Maybe they think that 2006 prices are the “real” prices and “2009” prices are a very short-lived aberration.  But here’s the crucial point:  homeowners bear the cost of delayed loss recognition by financial institutions.  Delayed loss recognition means homeowners floundering in unrealistic repayment plans and then losing their homes in foreclosure.  Delayed loss recognition means frozen credit markets because no one trusts financial institutions’ balance sheets.  Delayed loss recognition means magnifying, shifting, and socializing losses.  We only make matters worse when we try to pretend that these losses don’t exist.
We all know the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes, and how everybody plays along with the emperor’s conceit until a little boy points out that the emperor is stark naked.  To suggest that widespread financial institution insolvency would be caused by bankruptcy modification is akin to blaming the little boy for the emperor’s nudity.

Cramdown and Future Mortgage Credit Costs: Evidence and Theory

posted by Adam Levitin

I’ve written extensively (see here, here, e.g.) on why permitting modification of mortgages in bankruptcy would generally not result in higher credit costs or less credit availability. As the debate over bankruptcy reform legislation to help struggling homeowners and stabilize our financial system moves to the fore, it’s worth repeating some of the key points and making some new ones.

(1) The key comparison is bankruptcy modification versus foreclosure. Opponents of bankruptcy modification often misframe the issue, whether deliberately or ignorantly. It is not a question of bankruptcy losses versus no losses, but bankruptcy losses versus foreclosure losses. If bankruptcy losses are less than foreclosure losses, the market will not price against bankruptcy modification. This is an empirical question, and to date, my work with Joshua Goodman is the only evidence on it. Opponents of bankruptcy modification have only been able to respond with plain-out concocted numbers (e.g., the Mortgage Bankers Association) or insistence on applying economic theory that looks at the wrong question.

(2) Economic theory tells us that cramdown is unlikely to have much impact on mortgage credit costs going forward. The ability to cramdown a mortgage (reduce the secured debt to the value of the property) is essentially an option borrowers hold to protect themselves from negative equity. It is a costly option to exercise–it requires filing for bankruptcy, and that has serious costs and consequences. More importantly, though, cramdown is typically an out-of-the-money option. It is only in-the-money when (1) property values are falling enough that there’s negative equity and (2) likely to remain depressed in the long-term. Long-term declining residential property values have been the historical exception. What this means is going forward there really isn’t much for creditors to worry about with cramdown–homeowners can’t exercise an out-of-the-money option.

Moreover, because the likelihood of the cramdown option being in the money is Instead, it is an option that is more likely to be valuable when default is imminent, at which point the loan is in the secondary market. So to the extent that the cramdown option does cost creditors, it is the secondary market, and the effects on credit availability and cost to homeowners would be diffused.

(3) Arguments about bankruptcy court capacity and bankruptcy transaction costs are made by people who have no experience with the actual bankruptcy system. A serious misconception about bankruptcy modification is the belief that the bankruptcy judge would decide how to rewrite the mortgage. That’s not how bankruptcy works.  The debtor (and debtor’s counsel) would propose a repayment plan that includes a mortgage modification. The judge either confirms or denies the plan, depending on whether it meets the necessary statutory requirements. This means that bankruptcy judges can actually handle significant consumer bankruptcy case volume. If you want proof that the bankruptcy courts can handle a huge surge in filings, look at what happened in the fall of 2005, before BAPCPA went effective. The courts survived that flood of filings. Today the bankruptcy courts are better prepared; there are more bankruptcy judges (thank you BAPCPA) than in fall 2005. Nor would there be tremendous time and money lost in valuation disputes. After there are a handful of cases decided in a district, all the attorneys know what the likely outcomes would be in future cases and settle on valuations consensually. Court capacity and excessive transaction cost arguments are made by people who have never stepped foot into bankruptcy court.

(4) There’s no other serious option on the table. Permitting bankruptcy modification of mortgages will not by itself solve the finance crisis. It will not stop all foreclosures. But it will help stop some uneconomic foreclosures, which benefits homeowners, investors, communities, and the financial system. And, more importantly, whatever imperfections bankruptcy modification has as a solution, it’s the only real option on the table.

There is no other detailed legislative proposal. There are various economist pipedream proposals around, but even the best of them fail, either because they are politically unrealistic or because they are too rooted to a belief that the private market can solve problems with a tweak here and there. I believe that people and institutions respond to incentives, but market-based solutions haven’t worked to date. How many times do we have to be burned by “market-based” solutions before we try something else? The unfortunate truth is that no one understands enough about various mortgage market players’ incentives to properly align them. We can’t follow all the trails of servicing contracts, insurance, reinsurance, credit derivatives, overhead, and litigation risk and know what incentives look like. Even if we did, it would take serious time for the market to correct itself and start doing large-scale loan modification. That’s time that families don’t have, and I don’t think that anyone who is advocating a market-based solution is also pushing a foreclosure moratorium to allow the market to get its act together. Bankruptcy modification is the only game in town, and to pretend otherwise is disingenuous cover for opposing it in the name of “studying all the options.”

January 24, 2009 at 12:03 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (19)

Shared Appreciation Clawbacks

posted by Adam Levitin

As bankruptcy modification of mortgages (a/k/a Chapter 13 “cramdown”) looks more and more likely to become law, it’s worth considering what the final legislation might look like.  Already there have been some compromises in order to get Citibank’s support.

One issue that might be raised is a clawback of principal for creditors if there is future appreciation on a mortgage, the secured amount of which has been reduced in bankruptcy.  The question of shared appreciation emerged last year when bankruptcy modification failed to pass Congress and is one that has bedeviled many mortgage modification plans, including the Hope for Homeowners Act, not just bankruptcy modification.

Leaving aside the thorny question of how a clawback would work, I think it’s important to consider whether there should be a clawback.  How one views this issue, I think, depends heavily on framing.  If the comparison is between a modification involving a principal write-down and a loan that performs at its original terms, then permitting an appreciation clawback as part of the modification seems quite fair.   In this framework, it makes sense to try to give the creditor as close to its original bargain as possible; otherwise would be a windfall for the debtor.

But if the comparison is between a modification involving a principal write-down and foreclosure, then an appreciation clawback in the modification would result in a windfall for the creditor.   When a creditor forecloses on a house, the creditor doesn’t benefit from any future appreciation in the property’s value after the foreclosure sale.  The whole idea behind loan modifications, in bankruptcy or voluntary, is that they are value enhancing.  If a loan will perform at 75% of original value when modified, that’s a lot better than a 50% recovery in foreclosure.  If a creditor is already benefitting from a loan modification relative to foreclosure, why should the creditor then also receive a share of the property’s future appreciation?  Wouldn’t that be a windfall to the creditor?

Another way to see this is whether the modification is a temporary or contingent one or whether it is a life of the loan modification.  The danger with a temporary mod is that it just kicks the can down the road.  Requiring an appreciation clawback raises the question of modification sustainability.  Any which way, this is an issue that is likely to pop up again.

Mortgage servicing and standing

2 Mar

Cramdown Controversy #2–Will I “Succeed?”

posted by Katie Porter

Our active readers at Credit Slips already started debating the second controversy about the pending cramdown legislation: is the failure rate of chapter 13 too high to make mortgage modification in bankruptcy a very useful tool? To briefly reprise that discussion and add my own gloss, there are longstanding lamentations that chapter 13 is a poor system because a minority of debtors completes the repayment plan and receives a discharge. The academic studies suggest the number is about 33%; I believe the National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees thinks it is about 40% (one wonders why the US Trustee Program doesn’t carefully track this and publish it?)

So lots of chapter 13s fail. But what conclusion should we draw from that fact? This is a broad question and one that I’m exploring in a new empirical research project. I do not believe that chapter 13s “fail” just because they do not reach discharge. For now, let me narrow that concern to whether cramdown legislation is sound policy.  A  couple of observations:

  1. The failure rate for chapter 13 may be, at least to some unknown degree, a result of housing affordability problems. Tara Twomey, John Eggum, and I have a forthcoming paper showing that over 70% of chapter 13 homeowners in our 2006 sample spent more than 1/3 of their incomes on mortgage payments, the HUD benchmark for unaffordable housing. If cramdown lets debtors reduce their mortgage payments, it may permit more debtors to confirm plans and give debtors needed flexibility in adjusting their budgets to the normal ups and downs of life. Put another way, the low chapter 13 completion rate may be an effect of the inability under current law to modify mortgages, which is all the more reason to permit such modification.
  2. Lots of people are going to have upheavals in their lives just because that is life. As one of our Credit Slips commentators said: “Chapter 13 cases fail primarily because ‘_____  happens’ in the 3-5 year term of the plan. Debtors live and die; they change jobs; they lose jobs; they move; they buy and sell homes; they get married; they get divorced; they have kids; they lose kids; they get sick; etc. — all of which impact their financial circumstances.” These circumstances would occur and be problematic regardless of how we structured the mortgage relief–that is, they would hamper non-bk court modifications too.
  3. One benefit of modifying mortgages in bankruptcy is the potential to actually monitor what happens. IF the Administrative Office of the US Courts and the US Trustee Program release the needed data, scholars and advocates can track these cases. How many debtors are seeking modifications? What kinds of terms are courts granting? How are these debtors faring? Such data has been scarce of non-existent for the voluntary modification programs. What data do exist, such as those that Alan White examines, seem to me to indicate that a very high fraction of modifications are doomed to failure.

Cramdown Controversy #1–Who Do I Pay?

posted by Katie Porter

The pending legislation to permit courts to modify home mortgages is stirring up some controversies–even among its advocates. The key issues are operational and very important, I think, to the success of this legislation. Here’s the first brewing controversy: How will consumers make the payments on these modified mortgages (directly to the mortgage servicers or through the chapter 13 trustee?)

The pending legislation contains language that would require the payments on mortgages modified in bankruptcy to be made “directly to the holder of the claim.” In more than 2/3 of jurisdictions, chapter 13 trustees serve as conduits for at least many mortgage claims, meaning that the debtor pays the trustee the mortgage payment, along with their payment on their unsecured claims, and the trustee transmits the payment to the mortgage company. The legislation, apparently at the urging of some consumer advocates, would bar this practice. I think this is a bad approach for several reasons: Why change existing practices that are working well and add confusion? Some courts have local rules that require debtors to pay all claims through the trustee; the legislation would override such rules, which are growing in popularity becuase of problems with letting debtors make mortgage payments. Many debtors like the convenience of making only one payment–to the trustee–and letting the trustee disburse. It helps keep them on track financially and may improve completion of chapter 13 plans. Further, given the numerous and well-documented problems with mortgage servicers’ ability to correctly apply payments in chapter 13 cases, why put the burden of sorting all those problems out on the debtor or debtor’s counsel? If the trustee is the conduit for the payment, then the trustee can take steps to ensure the payments are applied properly and the debtor is being charged correctly. I suspect this stems from some concern that consumers shouldn’t have to bear the added costs of paying a trustee. Many trustees, however, take only 5% commission instead of the usual 10% for the disbursement on mortgages, and if Congress is concerned about this, they could amend section 586 to provide for a lower trustee fee for mortgages. Also, consumers who pay the trustee are getting services; the trustee is the one who must wait on hold with the mortgage servicer, try to reconcile the accounting, deal with RESPA and escrow issues, etc. I think it is fair to pay trustees for that work. I think debtors should have the option of making payments on a modified mortgage either directly to the mortgage company or through the trustee, as is currently the practice.

Cramdown Commentary

posted by Katie Porter

Bob scooped me on an initial post about the deal between Citigroup and Senate Democrats on pending legislation to permit bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages in bankruptcy. But I have details. And commentary. And questions.

First, the letters from Citibank to the House and Senate outlining the changes that they request be made to the legislation are available in the middle of this WSJ article. They requested three changes to S.66 or H.R. 200 (both denominated the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009). First, that the legislation be limited to loans in existence when the legislation is enacted. This gives the bill a sunset, of sorts, but it could be a long one, given some people have 30 or 40 years left on their loans. Second, only when a violation would give rise to a right of recission under the Truth in Lending Act can the claim be disallowed. Given the relative difficulty and cost of litigating such claims, this is not, in my opinion, a large concession. Consumers retain their rights under the Truth in Lending Act to bring a claim under its provisions and recovery (puny) statutory damages. Third, a reduction in a loan’s principal balance is only available if the homeowner certifies they contacted the lender to modify the loan before bankruptcy. Note that the “reduction in principal” is only ONE of the options available to bankruptcy courts. Apparently, the court could freeze or adjust interest rates or extend the term of a loan even if a borrower had not contacted the lender. The only problem I see here is if lenders begin litigating whether the borrower has indeed contacted the lender. Borrowers who did so by phone won’t have great records of having done so. I would advise borrowers who call to also send a written letter and keep a copy asking for a modification.

Apparently, the news of the Citi’s support for the legislation traveled fast and yesterday at chapter 13 confirmation hearings around the country, debtors asked to have their hearings continued to see if the legislation passed. I also wonder what are the options for homeowners who filed chapter 13 a few years or months ago and were not able to modify their home mortgages. Can they ask the court to modify their plan if the legislation passes?

Chapter 13 Cramdown Bill

posted by Bob Lawless

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that Citigroup is negotiating over the terms of a bill to give bankruptcy judges the power to adjust home mortgages in chapter 13. The article further reports that the National Association of Home Builders has dropped its opposition to the bill, although Citigroup says it still has not made a decision on what its final position will be. Credit industry opposition is the primary obstacle to passage of this legislation. If this opposition evaporates, the bill almost certainly will become law given its support among congressional leaders and the incoming Obama Administration. For background on how the law would work, see here.

UPDATE: Just as soon as I posted this, the news broke that a deal had been reached. This is a welcome development. Of course, the devil is in the details. If anyone has a link to the text of the legislation that would result from the deal, please post in the comments.

Loan Modification Quality Matters

posted by Tara Twomey

Yesterday new foreclosure and loss mitigation data was released by HOPE NOW in its “Loss Mitigation National Data July 07 to November 08” and by the OCC/OTS in their “Mortgage Metrics Report.” Combined the reports show a steadily increasing number of loan modifications and a slight decrease in foreclosures.  That’s the good news.  The bad news is a large number of loans that have been modified are redefaulting.  The OCC/OTS report shows 37% of loans were 60 or more days delinquent after six months.  Here’s an example to put this in real numbers.  The HOPE NOW report shows nearly 870,000 loan modification in 2008.  Using the 37% redefault rate means that  just over 317,000 borrowers will enter the foreclosure pipeline again within 6 months.

The reasons that borrowers are falling back into default is the source of much debate.  Industry representatives claim that every modification is affordable when it is made and borrowers redefault because their circumstances change.  Consumer advocates argue that servicers are not creating long-term, affordable loan modifications.

Whose side does the data support?

Continue reading “Loan Modification Quality Matters” »

December 23, 2008 at 11:02 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (18)

Poor Servicing Paves the Path for Predators

posted by Tara Twomey
Thanks to Credit Slips for having me back. I wanted to start the week talking about how poor mortgage servicing is paving the path for a new breed of predators and how little is being done to address the situation. Homeowners facing foreclosure have always been vulnerable to scammers, con-artists, and thieves. As soon as an impending foreclosure becomes public information, homeowners are bombarded with post cards, telephone calls and even door-to-door solicitations from would be saviors. When property values were appreciating rapidly, foreclosure rescue scams primarily focused on obtaining title to the home and robbing homeowners of their equity. Today with property prices depreciating and many homes already “underwater,” equity is no longer the game. Instead, rescuers have become high-volume, “loan modification specialists.” A recent editorial in the New York Times (here) and an article from BusinessWeek (here) describe this business that is now booming across the country. The gist of the business model is that for a fee, which can reach several thousand dollars, these specialists will attempt to obtain a loan modification for the borrower. But why are homeowners giving their precious dollars to loan modification specialists when they should be able to obtain the same results for no charge?

Continue reading “Poor Servicing Paves the Path for Predators” »

December 16, 2008 at 1:16 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Massachusetts SJC to Subprime Lenders: Clean Up Your Own Mess

posted by Adam Levitin

A major legal development in the foreclosure crisis occurred today in Massachusetts.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, regarded as one of the finest state courts in the country, upheld a preliminary injunction against Fremont Investment and Loan for foreclosing on any “structurally unfair loan” without court approval.

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December 10, 2008 at 9:01 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (10)

The Role of Recourse in Foreclosures

posted by Adam Levitin

Martin Feldstein has been pushing a mortgage bailout proposal that has been getting some undeserved attention (see here and here, e.g.).  Feldstein gets  (here, and here) how central negative equity is to the economic crisis.  Homeowners with negative equity have a reduced incentive to stay in their home if the mortgage is burdensome.  Negative equity fuels foreclosures, which in turn force down housing prices, setting off a downward spiral. Feldstein is right to focus on negative equity as a key issue for housing market stabilization. The problem is in his solution–it is based on a few erroneous factual premises, all of which could have been discovered with very limited Google searches.

Continue reading “The Role of Recourse in Foreclosures” »

Creditors: Fear Not?

posted by Katie Porter

Just as public ire at the mortgage industry reaches a pinnacle, courts have offered the mortgage companies refuge from their mistreatment of consumers in some recent rulings. While these decisions may be aberrations, they have powerful lessons for consumer debtors and their attorneys that bear some discussion.

A bankruptcy court ruled last week that the United States Trustee (UST) lacked the authority to bring a complaint against Countrywide for abusive mortgage servicing practices. (Hat tip to Amir Efrati at the Wall Street Journal for bringing the ruling to my attention.)The In re Sanchez court concludes that the UST failed to state a claim for sanctions because the UST is not authorized to pursue sanctions. I disagree.

Continue reading “Creditors: Fear Not? ” »

October 21, 2008 at 12:24 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (12)

It’s Still the Economy

posted by Christian E. Weller

You can’t be serious! Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke says what anybody with a passing interest in economics already knows — that it will take time for the economy to turn the corner — and the market tanks. The market seemed punch drunk on the massive stabilization packages — $2.5 trillion and counting — that the industrialized world was showering on failing financial institutions. A mere 36 hours later, though, Wall Street realized that it cannot regain its strength without a healthy Main Street. It was a weakening labor market, following a bursting housing bubble, that contributed to the massive foreclosure wave and to the crisis. No amount of tinkering with the stabilization package will detract from the fact that people and businesses need more income, not loans, to pay their bills and to invest in their future. It should be clear by now to everybody, even extremely myopic financial markets, that the next policy step lies in helping U.S. businesses and families back on their feet through a well designed second economic stimulus.

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Regulation Cannot Depend on Irrational Markets

posted by Christian E. Weller

At this point, it is all too clear that financial markets can get things wrong. This is not an isolated phenomenon. No, getting it wrong tends to be the name of the game for financial markets. Understanding that financial markets regularly underestimate or overestimate the risks of investing is crucial to the proper design of financial market regulations.

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Wealth Destruction by the Numbers

posted by Christian E. Weller

Financial markets went into free fall in late September and early October. The third quarter of 2008 continued the wealth destruction that took place in the previous nine months. This wealth decline is large, broad, and quick.

The primary reason for wealth building is retirement. Many families nearing retirement, though, relied primarily on their homes for their retirement income. According to the Federal Reserve, only 62.9% of families between the ages of 55 and 64, had a retirement account, such as a 401(k) or IRA, in 2004. The typical holding in such accounts was $83,000 in 2004 dollars. In comparison, 79.1% of such families owned their own house with a total typical value of $200,000. In other words, policymakers need to take a comprehensive view at restoring family wealth in an effort to strengthen retirement income security. Much of the policy attention has been on protecting housing wealth. Policy responses, though, need to match the problem, specifically by fostering a pension renaissance and by vastly improving existing retirement savings plans in addition to protecting housing wealth.

Continue reading “Wealth Destruction by the Numbers” »

How Long is the Way Out of the Hole?

posted by Christian E. Weller

The stock market just ended its worst week in history. This has sharply eroded families’ financial security. Under rather optimistic expectations it would take about six years before families can hope to achieve the same level of financial security as they had at the end of 2007, before the latest round in the financial market crisis took shape.

Continue reading “How Long is the Way Out of the Hole? ” »

LA Times: Illegal Immigrants Have Lower Mortgage Delinquency Rates

posted by Bob Lawless

The LA Times ran an article earlier this week reporting that undocumented immigrants to the United States had generally lower rates of mortgage delinquencies than other types of borrowers. It is an informative read and should be of interest to Credit Slips readers. The article is here. Hat tip to Credit Slips guest blogger, David Yen, for alerting me to the story.

October 12, 2008 at 10:33 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Who Needs Bankruptcy Reform?

posted by Elizabeth Warren

When Eric Nguyen, a 3L at Harvard Law School, conducted his research on the disproportionate efforts of families with children to save their homes through bankruptcy, he seemed to be embarking early on a promising scholarly career. But events have made his research intensely relevant to national debates. In an op-ed in today’s New York Times he reprises his central findings.  Eric endorses an amendment to the bankruptcy laws that would permit a bankruptcy judge to restructure home mortgages.

Senator Dodd and Congressman Miller advanced this proposal early last spring, but the lobbyists from the American Mortgage Association fought them off.  Even as the bailout took shape, the banking lobbyists were still calling the shots to block bankruptcy amendments. Not surprisingly, mortgage holders prefer a government bailout over taking the write downs on their bad mortgages.  The McCain proposal offers just that: a payoff on bad mortgages at their full face value. The taxpayers–rather than the investors–would take all the losses.

Eric’s op-ed is timely–but time is running out.

October 10, 2008 at 7:44 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (5)

More on the McCain Plan

posted by Adam Levitin

Now it appears that the McCain plan is to pay 100% of the outstanding balance on distressed mortgages (and, presumably prepayment penalties if applicable). What isn’t clear is whether the government refinancing will be for fair market value or at the old outstanding balance. If the later, it really won’t help folks with negative equity.

If the McCain plan is going to buy mortgages at 100 cents on the dollar and then replace them with, say, 80 cents on the dollar mortgages, there’s good news and bad.

Continue reading “More on the McCain Plan” »

Underwater Homeowners

posted by Adam Levitin

1 out of every 6 US homeowners is underwater. There’s probably no better indicator than being underwater of a mortgagor who is likely to end up in foreclosure. That’s very worrisome. And it means that foreclosure prevention plans that don’t address the problem of underwater homeowners aren’t going to help a lot.

Why the McCain Mortgage Refinancing Plan Won’t Fly

posted by Adam Levitin

Last night John McCain presented a “new” plan to deal with the financial crisis. Unlike the bailout rescue bill, it is a bottom-up plan, not a top-down plan, meaning that it focuses on helping homeowners, not financial institutions.

It’s commendable that now in October 2008, over a year into this foreclosure crisis, John McCain has recognized that homeowners need some help and is proposing to do something for them. The trouble is that his proposal won’t help.

Continue reading “Why the McCain Mortgage Refinancing Plan Won’t Fly” »

A Countrywide Settlement

posted by Angie Littwin

Bank of America has agreed to settle a deceptive mortgage practices lawsuit on behalf of its relatively new subsidiary, Countrywide Financial, the notoriously aggressive mortgage lender.  The attorneys general of Illinois and California negotiated the settlement on behalf of their states and at least nine others. The settlement will cost BOA approximately $3.5 billion in California and $190 million in Illinois. The settlement funds will go towards reducing payments for Countrywide borrowers with subprime and/or adjustable-rate mortgages, waiving prepayment and late fees, paying damages to customers who have already lost their homes, and subsidizing the relocation of those who are now in foreclosure.

A BOA spokesperson said that the bank plans to introduce the program in December. Hopefully more details about who will qualify will be available soon.

Foreclosure Tragedy

posted by Angie Littwin

An excruciatingly sad story about the human costs of the home-mortgage crisis:  http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/10/03/eviction.suicide.attempt/index.html. A 90-year-old woman, Addie Polk, shot herself inside her foreclosed, Akron, Ohio home. It appears that she will live, although she is still in the hospital. Representative Dennis Kucinich, a member of her state’s congressional delegation, told her story on the House floor during today’s bailout debate, saying, “This bill does nothing for the Addie Polks of the world.” He voted against the bailout, which finally passed in the House this afternoon.

Homeowners in Bankruptcy

posted by Adam Levitin

Katie Porter makes some excellent observations about the Carroll and Li study of homeowners in bankruptcy. There’s another crucial point to add: the study’s conclusions only tell us, at best, about bankruptcy today. It shouldn’t be much of a surprise that bankruptcy doesn’t have a huge impact on homeownership retention precisely because it is impossible to modify single-family principal residence mortgages in bankruptcy. The study is looking at a bankruptcy system with both hands tied behind its back. Given that bankruptcy already results in a 15% higher level of homeownership retention than foreclosure, one would expect a much greater impact if debtors could adjust their mortgages to make them affordable.

Consider–Credit Suisse has found that voluntary loan modifications that reduce monthly payments have an 83% success rate in the current market. Involuntary modifications could be even more significant than voluntary modifications. If bankruptcy modification were allowed and we saw a similar success rate in homeownership retention, that would be a big accomplishment indeed.

Thus, I think a fairer interpretation of the study’s findings are that currently bankruptcy helps a bit with homeownership retention, even though it is working with the very modest tool set of the stay and a chance to de-accelerate and cure, and that with a broader tool set to modify mortgages, bankruptcy could make a big difference in homeownership retention.

October 2, 2008 at 6:16 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (5)

What Happens to Homeowners in Bankruptcy?

posted by Katie Porter

Amending bankruptcy law to permit judges to modify home loans for chapter 13 debtors does not seem to be gaining traction in Congress, despite the fiasco with the bailout vote and pressure to incorporate more “Main Street” provisions. For many reasons, I remain convinced that any bailout should attempt to limit losses at the family-level, rather than addressing only the end consequences for major financial institutions. That said, does filing bankruptcy improve a family’s chances of saving its home?

A new paper, The Homeownership Experience of Households in Bankruptcy, by economists Sarah Carroll and Wenli Li provides a tenative answer to this question. Before summarizing the findings, let me emphasize a few key points. The paper’s sample comes from Delaware. Yup, that’s it. That limits my confidence, and to their credit, the authors’ confidence, about extrapolating these findings to the whole nation. Another difficulty is that the housing market has changed so rapidly that despite the authors’ quick production of this study, the mortgages of today’s families may look very different from those of families that filed bankruptcy in 2002. Keeping those qualifications in mind, what do Carroll & Li report on how many homeowners that file bankruptcy avoid foreclosure.

Continue reading “What Happens to Homeowners in Bankruptcy?” »

How State Government Can Help Financially Distressed Homeowners

posted by Adam Levitin

Now that Congress has failed to act to stem the foreclosure crisis, it is up to states to try to protect their residents and economies. A few possibilities remain for state action, some of which states have either toyed with or started to do.

Continue reading “How State Government Can Help Financially Distressed Homeowners” »

September 29, 2008 at 1:07 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (1)

Congress to Homeowners: Drop Dead

posted by Adam Levitin

A draft of the bailout plan is out. And it contains nothing substantive for financially distressed homeowners.

The plan directs the Treasury Department to engage in reasonable modifications for residential mortgage loans it controls and to encourage servicers to do so for loans it doesn’t control. As I’ve explained in numerous posts (here and here, e.g.), Treasury is unlikely to end up controlling many distressed residential mortgage loans directly. And Treasury has been encouraging servicers to do loan modifications since last fall, but with very limited success. There is no reason to think that the bailout suddenly changes anything. In short, Congress enacted some show provisions about consumer relief, but nothing of substance. This is the same move Congress pulled when it enacted the HOPE for Homeowners Act in July. All sizzle, no steak.

Continue reading “Congress to Homeowners: Drop Dead” »

Why The Government Cannot Modify Mortgages If It Purchases $700BN of MBS

posted by Adam Levitin

I’ve written a short explanation of the why even if the Treasury buys $700BN of MBS it will be unable to modify the underlying mortgages. The explanation, which is more detailed than any of my previous postings on the subject, is available here.

At core it is a Trust Indenture Act problem, where the bonds cannot be modified absent a specified majority vote and consent of bondholders whose payment rights are affected. And here is no possibility of doing an exchange offer to get around it; there is simply no mechanism for an MBS trust to do an exchange offer. (For the classic discussion of Trust Indenture problems, see Mark Roe’s article, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts.) The solution of Trust Indenture Act problems with corporate bonds is…you guessed it, bankruptcy modification!

September 24, 2008 at 1:12 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (17)

Mortgage Bankers Association’s Cramdown Claim Debunked

posted by Adam Levitin

I have received several inquiries about the Mortgage Bankers Association’s spurious claim that permitting modification of mortgages in bankruptcy will result in higher interest rates or less credit availability. I have drafted a very short explanation of why the MBA’s claim is patently false and in fact disprovable. It is available here.

September 24, 2008 at 9:33 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (2)

Mortgage Modification in Bankruptcy: Redux

posted by Adam Levitin

The Dodd and Frank bailout proposals have both put the possibility of modifying mortgages in bankruptcy back on the table. To some Credit Slips readers, this is old hat (see below for links to our past posts). But I want to provide a quick primer for those who are not well-versed in the issue.

Continue reading “Mortgage Modification in Bankruptcy: Redux” »

The Bailout — another perspective (part 1)

posted by Stephen Lubben

First, I want to thank Bob Lawless and the rest of the Credit Slips folks for having me back yet again — I’m getting to be like the guest who would not leave.

Second, while it might make me part of the “establishment,” I’m going to say right from that start that I join those who favor the bailout.

I also think we need to avoid a whole lot of knee jerk reactions that are floating around out there — like the SEC’s ban on short selling, which is quickly becoming the Bad Management Protection Act of 2008.  Of course, the notion that the administration can open the door on this issue “just a little” is also equally suspect.

I view the economy and the larger financial system as being at a Titanic like moment:  post iceberg, per submersion.  It is certainly reasonable to disdain those who got us into this situation, but I’m not going to let my feelings for them get in the way of saving as many people as possible.

That said, I understand why there is a good deal of skepticism about the bailout.  In part chapter 11 is to blame — there has been almost no effort to explain why AIG is different from Enron, United Airlines, or any other really big corporation that has recently failed.  And the financial industry needs to fess up that it blew its chance to self-regulate the credit default swap market — too many people, even myself to some degree, bought the “trust us, we’re experts” line from ISDA and other market players.

No wonder people aren’t buying that line in connection with the bailout — especially when the administration has its own credibility problems in this regard in connection with other big, complex projects in the non-financial area.

More on the chapter 11 issue, and why I think the administration has done a terrible job of selling this but still generally support the bailout, after the jump.  I’ll save my thoughts on the CDS market for another post.

Continue reading “The Bailout — another perspective (part 1)” »

Before I Hand Over a $700 Billion Check, How About Some Balances?

posted by Bob Lawless

When the government bailout of the financial industry was first announced, we were told more details would be forthcoming. The weekend has passed, and we still have few details. We’re being told that there is a big threat, things have to happen quickly, and we give the Administration broad powers and trust them to do the right thing. When have we heard that before? Rather than being steamrollered again, Congress should demand some accountability rather than giving Treasury and Hank Paulson unfettered powers.

To the extent we have more information than we did on Friday, the proposal has become vaguer. Instead of mortgage-related securities, Treasury now would be authorized to purchase “any financial instrument.” Instead of the buyout being limited to institutions with headquarters in the United States, Treasury could buy “any financial instrument” from an entity with “significant operations in the United States.”

Continue reading “Before I Hand Over a $700 Billion Check, How About Some Balances?” »

It’s Easier to Shoot Roadkill than Big Game

posted by Katie Porter

I’m a little miffed about the recent FTC settlement with Bear Stearns and its subsidiary, EMC Mortgage Corporation. The complaint alleged that EMC engaged in unlawful practices in servicing consumers’ home mortgage loans, including violating the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Truth in Lending Act. The FTC brought the complaint pursuant to its enforcement authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices. A recently announced settlement requires Bear and EMC to pay $28 million to the FTC and enjoins the company from engaging in the alleged illegal practices. Given my concern about poor mortgage servicing, you might expect me to have nothing but praise for the FTC.

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September 16, 2008 at 11:02 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (7)

As Treasury Sows, So Shall It Reap

posted by Elizabeth Warren

Once the Treasury bailed out Bear Stearns with government guarantees, the next buyer of a major US financial institution might expect similar help. Barclay’s was the last likely buyer of Lehman Brothers.  Minutes ago, it announced that without the US taxpayers putting their money on the line, Barclay’s isn’t interested in buying.

We can debate whether the government should have bailed out Bear Stearns, but surely the current mess tells us one thing we should not have done:  Bail out Bear Stearns and then return to business-as-usual.  So long as the only tool the government seems to have to halt this crisis is a bailout, then we are in trouble.  More bailouts will be needed, and, at some point, even the American taxpayer can’t handle it.

Continue reading “As Treasury Sows, So Shall It Reap” »

September 14, 2008 at 3:46 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

Lose Your Home, Lose Your Vote

posted by Elizabeth Warren

With both political parties are focused on Michigan this fall, high foreclosure rates and the neighborhood fallout from those foreclosures are likely to become a political issue.  The GOP has announced a new way to deal with the problem: challenge the voting eligibility of people whose homes have been posted for foreclosure.  Evidently the GOP thinks those people are more likely to vote Democratic, so it can neutralize the impact of a sour housing market by barring votes from those who are losing their homes.

It isn’t clear from the report whether the challenge is based on posted foreclosures or homes that have already been transferred from the homeowner. Presumably the challenge is based on no longer living in the area.  Depending on how the list is constructed, this means challenging some larger or smaller number of people who are in financial trouble, but who are in their homes and are certainly eligible to vote in their local precincts.

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September 11, 2008 at 11:15 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (10)

Congress is Costing You Thousands of Dollars…?

posted by Angie Littwin

The other day I heard an alarming advertisement on the radio. It began by warning that a new federal law could cost “you” thousands of dollars. It then proceeded to say that, if you want to avoid paying this money, you’d better hurry, hurry, hurry and purchase a home by September 30, when the statute goes into effect. The ad had the tone of a going-out-of-business sale: “Think you have all year to buy a home? Not anymore! Act now while you can still afford to make your dream of home ownership a reality! Offer (or law, in this case) expires on September 30, 2008.” (Not an exact quote.) By this point, I was waiting with bated breath to find out how Congress was going to drain potential homeowners of so much money.  Didn’t it just pass a law designed to help homeowners weather the mortgage meltdown?

Well, it turns out that the thousands of dollars new home buyers will be paying are their own down payments. After some careful listening and some less careful inference based on the September 30 date, I came to the conclusion that the ad was referring to the ban on seller-financed down payments in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. The bill was signed into law on June 30 and will go into effect on the October 1 (hence the rush to sell before then). The law’s main focus is providing help for current struggling homeowners, but it gets just a little bit proactive about prevention by banning sellers from lending money for down payments. This provision is intended to protect homeowners in the long run. It forces buyers to do a sticker-shock test on whether they can really afford their new homes. And it eliminates some incentives for seller-lenders to overprice houses. When a seller is financing the down payment, there’s a temptation to overstate the price because, in the company’s role as a lender, it will have the final say over whether the buyer can really afford to spend that much. The only pricing obstacle left to overcome is the buyer, and it’s reasonable to think that buyers will be slightly less sensitive to price when they’re not paying as much of it right away.

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September 3, 2008 at 8:58 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack (0)

Frisky Philly Sheriff

posted by John Pottow

Did people see the news reports a month or so ago about John Green, the Sheriff in Philadelphia, who has been exercising “civil” (“official”?) disobedience regarding home foreclosures?  I’m torn between whether I think this guy is a shameless opportunist betraying the taxpayers who expect “The Law” to be the final line to enforce such unpopular decisions as a judgment of foreclosure or whether he’s a hero who who’s bringing a dose of common sense to the housing debacle.  Here’s the webpage for his office.  Thoughts?

August 1, 2008 at 4:54 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (4)

Debtors Win Victories Against Mortgage Servicers

posted by Katie Porter

In the last few weeks, several courts have issued opinions ruling that mortgage servicers’ actions have harmed consumers. Some of you follow this issue closely, but if you need an introduction, I’ve previously posted a bit on the basics of mortgage servicing and why it’s an important component of the foreclosure problem. After the jump, I summarize three recent and newsworthy decisions. Debtors won big in these cases, variously recovering sizeable damages, having the foreclosure action against their home dismissed, or getting a preliminary injunction issued against a servicer’s misconduct. Taken collectively, they all signal an increased willingness by courts at all levels (state, federal, bankruptcy) to take challenges to mortgage servicers’ actions seriously. While I’m convinced that legislation, regulatory enforcement, and different market incentives are necessary to stop the misbehavior of mortgage servicers, this trio of decisions shows how litigation can help real families and point the way for further policymaking.

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July 23, 2008 at 11:20 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

The REALLY Sad State of Mortgage Servicing

posted by Katie Porter

In 2003, Chapter 13 trustee Henry Hildebrand III wrote a short piece for the American Bankruptcy Institute magazine entitled the Sad State of Mortgage Servicing. On the front lines of chapter 13 every day, Hildebrand was one of the first people to draw national attention to the problems of mortgage servicing in bankruptcy. The mortgage servicers didn’t like the characterization, but years later, even after a Senate hearing and major media coverage of the problem, the description is still apt.

A customer legally tape-recorded his conversation with his mortgage servicer, one of the nation’s largest financial institutions (and no, it’s not Countrywide!) His attorney shared it with me, and I’m posting some excerpts after the jump. I won’t give away all the fun, but as you read, remember that mortgage servicing agents are the people on the front-lines of purported foreclosure prevention efforts. Without better training of servicing agents and regulation of mortgage servicers’ financial incentives, is it any wonder that we continue to see loss mitigation stall while foreclosures spiral upward?

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July 15, 2008 at 10:01 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (14)

What Would a Fannie/Freddie Conservatorship Look Like?

posted by Adam Levitin
[Updated 9.8.08. Since I wrote this post, federal law has changed, as a banking law practitioner was kind enough to point out to me. Section 1367 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-289, which became law on July 30, 2008, changes the GSE conservatorship provisions to ones that very closely track the bank conservatorship provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. In light of these (very needed) changes, the concerns I expressed in the post are no longer an issue.] One of the possible rescue options for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is a conservatorship.  But what would this look like?  The New York Times relates that “Officials said that [Treasury Secretary] Paulson wanted to convey the message that…a conservator would have to prepare a plan to restore the company to financial health, much like a company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.”

That’s the general idea, but the devil is very much in the details, as explained below the break.

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The “Oh Shit” Moment

posted by Adam Levitin

Today was the “oh shit” moment in the mortgage crisis. (Hey, this isn’t a family-oriented blog…) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s shares crashed because of fears that they are overleveraged and even balance sheet insolvent on a mark-to-market basis. And the FDIC shut down IndyMac, the ninth largest thrift in the country, and the first major bank failure since the S&L crisis.

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July 11, 2008 at 8:34 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Federal Government Off-Balance Sheet Entities

posted by Adam Levitin

As attention in the mortgage crisis starts to focus on Fannie and Freddie, I think it’s worth pointing out that they’re basically the same problem as the SIVs–Fannie and Freddie are the federal government’s off-balance sheet entities. They are the federal government’s SIVs. And like the SIVs they got overleveraged, and the question is whether to pull them back on the balance sheet in some way or not.

July 11, 2008 at 8:33 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (4)

Will BoA Claim Preemption?

posted by Bob Lawless

Today (July 1) is supposed to be the closing date for the Bank of America/Countrywide merger. In recent weeks, the states of Illinois, New York, and Florida have sued Countrywide for various wrongs committed to the citizens of their states. People are lining up to sue Countrywide. As the deal has been going through the approval processes, numerous commentators have wondered about why Bank of America is willing to expose itself to such liability.

Once the merger goes through, I wonder whether Bank of America is going to claim these lawsuits are preempted by the regulations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). This obscure federal agency has regulatory authority over national banks and has issued regulations exempting national banks like Bank of America from state laws and regulations governing lending. To legal types, this concept is known as “preemption,” and the OCC regulations were upheld by the United States Supreme Court as we discussed here and here.

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July 1, 2008 at 11:40 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

Private Mortgage Insurers Feel the Mortgage Hit

posted by Adam Levitin

The continuing mortgage crisis is now making itself felt in the private mortgage industry. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac recently announced they would cease purchasing mortgages insured by Triad Guaranty, the smallest of the seven private mortgage insurers that make up most of the market. That was a death sentence for Triad, which was unable to consummate a sale of its business. Triad has now stopped underwriting new business and is now engaged in a “run-off” (insurance-speak for “wind-down”). See here for more details on Triad’s demise and notes on another three PMI companies that could face Triad’s fate.

I’ve been puzzled why PMI insurers weren’t more vocal advocates of mortgage modification in bankruptcy. Most, (but not all) have exclusions for bankruptcy modification losses. That means PMI insurers would be required to pay out in foreclosure, but not in bankruptcy. Given that, you’d think they (and their state insurance regulators) would be pushing for legislation permitting modification of all mortgages in bankruptcy. If anyone can explain the political economy of the PMI industry’s slumber on bankruptcy modification, it’d be great to have in the comments.

June 24, 2008 at 12:42 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (2)

Countrywide’s Politically Connected VIPs

posted by Bob Lawless

Credit Slips readers will want to take a look at this article in Conde Nast’s Portfolio.com. The article describes Countrywide’s VIP program, which gave favorable loan terms to politically connected individuals. Beneficiaries of Countrywide’s largesse would receive reduced fees on their loans and were allowed a free float down of their interest rate if the market rate went down after the rate was locked in. From the beginning of the article:

Two U.S. senators, two former Cabinet members, and a former ambassador to the United Nations received loans from Countrywide Financial through a little-known program that waived points, lender fees, and company borrowing rules for prominent people.

The New York Times carried a story today about the response of Senator Dodd, one of the senators mentioned in the story.

Hat tip to my ceremonial dagger-wielding colleague for pointing my way to this story.

Paying for Mistakes–Redux

posted by Jonathan Lipson

Well, if the comments are any indication, Tuesday’s post–where I discussed articles about problems with home equity lenders pulling their lines and errors in bond ratings–seems to have a struck a nerve.  Rather than reply to each, I will reply to all in a general way.

First, a number of comments suggested that I was soft on fraudulent borrowers or too hard on the rating agencies.  “Jarhead,” for example, admonished that we should “start to sue borrowers.” “AMC” doesn’t understand why lenders shouldn’t be entitled to the full benefit of their contract rights.  “Orville R” claims that “nobody, I repeat nobody, for[e]saw [sic] the unprecedented 20% drop in house values.”   In any case, he suggests, Moody’s mistakes were a “non-story” because Moody’s ratings simply reflected disagreements among the professionals–in particular the lawyers.

I should be clear that I have no sympathies for any particular type of stakeholder in the mortgage mess.  I think no category of participant has a monopoly on cupidity, deceit or incompetence.  Thus, I agree that many borrowers who probably knew better (or should have known better) should be held to the bargains they struck.  But that’s exactly what we’re doing.  Jarhead’s comment that we should sue borrowers ignores the fact that we are: It’s called “foreclosure,” and the rates of suit are apparently at historic highs.

Continue reading ” Paying for Mistakes–Redux” »

June 12, 2008 at 9:18 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (8)

2.47% of All Residential Mortgage Are in Foreclosure

posted by Adam Levitin

According to the Mortgage Bankers Association’s Delinquency Survey, 2.47% of 1-4 family residential mortgages are in foreclosure and 6.35% are delinquent. And Credit Suisse’s prediction of 6.5 million foreclosures by 2012 still looms. Scary numbers.

June 5, 2008 at 10:28 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (4)

From Redlining to Target Practice

posted by Elizabeth Warren

Redlining was a practice that banks once used:  hang a map on the wall, draw a red line around minority neighborhoods, and deny all mortgage loans inside the line.  The results were devastating–depressed prices because no one could get financing to buy homes and underinvestment in African American and Hispanic communities.

But those bad old days are gone.  Now some lenders seem to draw a line around minority neighborhoods, then paint a big bulls-eye on them.  That’s where they target their worst mortgages.  Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley filed suit yesterday against Option One, the mortgage arm of H&R Block, alleging that they piled on costs for non-white families.

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June 4, 2008 at 3:24 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (10)

Credit Card Debt Absent the Mortgage Bubble

posted by Adam Levitin

We tend to view credit card debt and mortgage debt in isolation, but its important to remember that the two are highly fungible. This means that when consumers leveraged up with mortgage debt in recent years, the were partially deleveraging their card debt. This means that but for the mortgage bubble, we’d be seeing much higher levels of credit card debt (and that’s where we’re headed).

The mortgage bubble of the past few years was largely a refinancing bubble, not a purchase money bubble (much less a first-time homebuyer bubble). When people refinanced, they were not just refinancing their mortgages. They were also refinancing their credit card debt. Or, more precisely, they were converting their unsecured high interest credit card debt into lower interest, but secured, mortgage debt. There was a brilliant framing in the subprime pitch—pay off your 22% CC debt with a 9% mortgage. Seems like a no-brainer when pitched that way. There were some folks who refinanced multiple times, each time paying off thousands, if not tens of thousands of dollars of credit card debt (and other non-mortgage debt).

This has an important implication that has escaped notice.

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Unconscionability and Funky Mortgages

posted by Nathalie Martin

People have posted some comments to the funky mortgage story and I wondered if anyone had any experience using the doctrine of unconscionability to help ward off foreclosure and keep people in their homes.  As a contracts teacher, I know the doctrine is old and tired and disparaged, but it is still out there and was used with a least some success in the days of the phony home repairs/unfavorable mortgage refinancing schemes popular in the late 90’s. See, e.g., Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2002). The Restatement of Contracts includes one unconscionability factor that seems right on in these situations, namely that the stronger party had no reasonable believe that the weaker party would be able to receive substantial benefits under the contract, which I read to include situations where the weaker party has no chance of actually performing the contract. There also is language in the Restatement about how the weaker party is unable to reasonably protect his interests by reason of . . . ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the language of the agreement.   Various state consumer protection statutes invite courts to weigh similar factors. Does any of this get us anywhere, or is this just wishful thinking?  Or, is this another one of those times where securitization will eliminate the defense because unconcionabilty cannot be asserted against a successor in interest? Do tell….

May 28, 2008 at 2:57 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (2)

The Magical Mystery Mortgage: Loans Gone Wild

posted by Nathalie Martin

This site has had some fabulous posts about mortgage fees in Chapter 13 and mortgage services fraud. This is a short story about mortgage fees or funky interest rates, or perhaps just plain old fraud, in the context of the stripdown of a mobile home. Many of us know about negative amortization mortgages, ARMs that adjust up when the rate goes up, ARMs that adjust up no matter what happens, 2/28s, and a host of other exotics. I think, however, I have discovered a new type, one that has the same principal balance no matter how much money the borrower pays on the loan. I call it the magical mystery mortgage.

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May 27, 2008 at 10:54 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

Vulture Mentality of Piling On Fees or Countercyclical Diversification Strategy

posted by Katie Porter

In the recent hearing on mortgage servicing, the Senators probed Countrywide’s chief executive for loan administration, Steve Bailey, on exactly how mortgage servicers (distinct from the owners of the mortgage) make their profits. Mr. Bailey confirmed the description in my article of the three ways that servicers earn revenue: a fee that is a percentage of the mortgage, float income from interest on temporarily-held funds, and retained fees such as late charges and other fees that are paid by borrowers.  Senator Schumer described the imposition of these default costs as “piling on” and expressed a fear that a “vulture mentality” was developing among servicers as defaults rise. Mr. Bailey tried to diffuse these concerns, but Senator Schumer called him to task in attempting to deny that servicers can and do generate profit from delinquent homeowners, even when borrowers and loan holders might benefit if the family retained its home, rather than struggle to pay an avalanche of default costs. The Senator quoted from a Countrywide earnings’ call that characterized the “piling on” practice as a “counter-cyclical diversification strategy.”

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May 16, 2008 at 5:56 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Senate Investigates Mortgage Servicing

posted by Katie Porter

Last week, I testified before a subcomittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary committee about mortgage servicing in bankruptcy. You can read the written testimony or watch a webcast. Both the Chair of the subcommittee, Senator Schumer, and the Ranking Member, Senator Sessions had some harsh words for the current state of mortgage servicing in bankruptcy. Apparently (and encouragingly, at least to me), charging people only what they owe is a bipartisan issue.

Robin Atchley, a former homeowner from Georgia, testified about how her “bankruptcy case was a tug of war with Countrywide over our house.” It was a war that the Atchleys lost, deciding to throw in the towel when their son, Payden, insisted that the couple use his lunch money to help pay the mortgage payments. From her perspective, rather than giving them a fair chance to save their “dream home”, the bankruptcy process gave Countrywide even more opportunities to profit. The Today show profiled the Atchleys, whose case is now the subject of a lawsuit by the U.S. Trustee’s office.

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Mortgage Debt & Home Equity

2 Mar

Mortgage Fees in Chapter 13: Rules to the Rescue?

posted by Gene Wedoff

In a February post to Credit Slips, Katie Porter pointed out a recurring problem for U.S. debtors trying to deal with mortgage defaults through a Chapter 13 plan.  They can make all of the payments needed to cure their pre-bankruptcy defaults and all of the principal, interest, and escrow payments that become due while the case is pending, but still end the case substantially behind on their mortgages, due to additional fees and charges claimed to have accrued during the case, such as mortgagee’s attorneys fees, inspection fees, and late charges.  Professor Porter voiced support for  proposed legislation—the Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008—that would require mortgagees to give notice of such post-bankruptcy fees while the bankruptcy case was still pending, so that debtors could either challenge the fees or provide for their payment under bankruptcy protection.  But the fee-notice provision was only one part of the proposed legislation.  The legislation also provided for modifying the terms of home mortgages in bankruptcy, and with opposition from mortgage providers, it failed to survive a filibuster threat.

Perhaps a new bankruptcy rule on disclosure of mortgage fees—unconnected to mortgage modification— could deal effectively with the problem. Like the proposed legislation, a rule could require mortgagees to give reasonable notice of extra fees or charges that arise during the course of a Chapter 13 case and could provide that if the required notice is not given, the fees may not be assessed.  A streamlined procedure for resolving any disputes over the fees could also be implemented by rule.  Although the process of adopting a rule is long—generally at least three years—it has the advantage of being insulated from much of the political pressure brought to bear on Congress.  Moreover, in contrast to their response to mortgage-modification legislation, mortgage providers might support a rule on notice of post-bankruptcy mortgage fees.   Currently, local courts and individual judges have adopted a variety of methods for dealing with such fees (for example, Section B.2(b) of the model plan for the Northern District of Illinois).  A uniform rule on the question would offer reduced costs of compliance for mortgagees, as well as a level of protection for debtors.

May 10, 2008 at 1:51 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (5)

Housing Bankruptcy Ripple Effect

posted by Adam Levitin

We’re starting to see the bankruptcy ripple effect of the housing crisis beyond the housing and financial services industry. Now municipalities are being forced to declare bankruptcy because property tax revenue has dried up while foreclosures have imposed significant strains on municipal resources.

While moral hazard concerns are a real issue for any government aid to borrowers or lenders, its worthwhile remembering a major exception to moral hazard–third-party costs. As Larry Summers summarizes: When the fire department rescues people who start fires by smoking in bed, it creates a moral hazard for in-bed smokers. But no one gets exercised about moral hazard, in part because we know that fires can spread and burn down neighbors’ apartments in “contagion” fires and that the in-bed smokers won’t take care to insure their neighbors. That’s what we’re seeing in foreclosure crisis–mounting third-party costs to neighbors and local government. If the municipal government goes bankrupt, it affects everyone in the community–indeed, those who had to relocate because of foreclosure escape this consequence. Foreclosure is a real problem for everyone, not just those who get kicked out of their homes or whose investment portfolios take a hit.

May 8, 2008 at 7:07 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Preemption Chutzpah

posted by Adam Levitin

Elizabeth Warren draws our attention to an astonishing example of banking industry chutzpah–claiming preemption protection against state foreclosure laws. Not only has no one ever historically believed that state foreclose law was preempted; the OCC’s preemption reg’s specifically carve out state debt collection law from preemption. There’s no conflict preemption here, and given specific mortgage preemption laws like DIDMCA and AMTPA that preempt state usury limits on some mortgages and limits on exotic mortgage structures, it is hard to see how there is general field preemption or the like.

The preemption argument is even more chutzpadik, though, because banks hold only a small percentage of mortgages. Most mortgages are held by securitization trusts. The last time I checked, they are not federally chartered financial institutions nor are they operating subsidiaries or agents of federally chartered financial institutions. Thus it is utterly beyond me how anyone could claim that preemption applies to mortgages owned by securitization trusts, even if the mortgages were originated by national banks and are serviced by them. The preemption claim here doesn’t even pass the straight-face test. As unbelievable as it is, though, perhaps legislation should clarify this just to, um, foreclose possible preemption arguments.

I’m curious whether the same financial institutions pushing the preemption claim are also the same institutions that are members of the HOPE Now Alliance, who have supposedly committed themselves to working to modify loans rather than foreclose. The preemption agenda is simply inconsistent with a commitment to efforts to avoid foreclosure.

Banks: State Laws Not for Us

posted by Elizabeth Warren

Just when you think the mortgage mess can’t get any worse, the banks come up with a new idea: They shouldn’t have to obey state law when they foreclose on someone’s home.

Pre-emption has been a gravy train for the national banks, insulating their credit card business from state laws. Some banks now want another ride on the pre-emption train, claiming that they shouldn’t have to follow local foreclosure laws when they take people’s homes.

Tomorrow Congressmen Brad Miller (D, NC) and Steve LaTourette (R, OH) will introduce HR 5380 to make it clear that the banks have to follow the state law foreclosure laws, just like they always have. Amazingly, this is expected to be a close vote.

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May 6, 2008 at 8:21 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

When Agencies Get it Wrong, They Reeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeealy Get it Wrong

posted by Mechele Dickerson

We ended the first day of the conference with management professors, Professor Gerry McNamara (Michigan State University) and Professor Paul M. Vaaler (University of Minnesota). They discussed How and Why Credit Assessors “Get It Wrong” when Judging the Risk of Borrowers: Past and Present Evidence at Home and Abroad. Professor Vaaler observed that the subprime meltdown is just one of the latest mistakes the rating agencies have made in recent times (he also points to the S&L crisis, Asian financial crisis). He argues, however, that private, credit rating agencies are at the center of the current housing crisis.

Professor Vaaler stressed that the agencies almost always get it right when assessing the risk posed by individual securities. But, when they get it wrong they get it wrong in a spectacular way.

Continue reading “When Agencies Get it Wrong, They Reeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeealy Get it Wrong” »

How did Lenders Get it So Wrong?

posted by Mechele Dickerson

An economist, Professor Amir Sufi (University of Chicago), shifted our focus in the afternoon session from debtor, to lender, behavior. In discussing his paper, Lender Incentives, Credit Risk, and Securitization: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Professor Sufi asks why lenders made such bad decisions when making subprime mortgages. He concludes that securitization reduced lender incentives to scrutinize borrowers, because lenders knew they would sell virtually all the subprime loans they originated and, thus, knew they would shed the credit risk associated with those loans. Professor Sufi argues that this is to be expected, since financial intermediaries overcome information frictions only if they have an incentive to properly screen and monitor borrowers.

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A Week in the Life of Mortgage “Reform”

posted by Mechele Dickerson

Here’s a mortgage crisis chronology for this week, as reported by the New York Times and Washington Post.  Can you guess what these articles have in common?

On Sunday, Michelle Singletary’s The Color of Money column discussed Treasury Secretary’s Henry Paulson’s recommendation to create a Mortgage Origination Commission that would promulgate standards for mortgage loan officers and would rate and report state efforts to license and regulate mortgage brokers.  In her view, a new Commission isn’t needed.  Instead, she argues that what we need to do is send some of these people to jail.  Rather than have a commission talk about their fraudulent acts, she suggests that we need to criminally prosecute loan officers who have engaged in fraudulent lending activities.

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April 30, 2008 at 7:33 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (13)

Homeownership Myth (Part II)

posted by Mechele Dickerson

As I argue in the earlier posting, the Sunday Washington Post article raises a number of interesting points about the value of homeownership as an investment device.  I discuss many of these points in an article that will be published this Fall, and ultimately conclude that it is time to debunk some of the myths associated with homeownership.

Continue reading “Homeownership Myth (Part II)” »

The Myth of Homeownership

posted by Mechele Dickerson

An article in the Sunday Washington Post asks whether — given the current housing crisis — real estate or the stock market is the better investment.  Of course, the answer is — it depends.  Formulating a longer, more sensible answer happens to be something I’ve been thinking about for the last several months and is the subject of my current research.  I’ll discuss this article in two posts.  Here’s the first one.

As the title of one of my forthcoming articles suggests (“The Myth of Home Ownership, and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing”), I challenge this country’s obsession with Homeownership and the view that attaining homeownership is crucial to achieving the American Dream.  I’ll discuss a few points raised in the Post article to explain how I’ve reached these somewhat heretical views.

Continue reading “The Myth of Homeownership” »

The Future of Mortgage Servicing

posted by Katie Porter

In my prior post on mortgage servicing, I talked about the potential of mortgage servicers to be harmful barriers between homeowners and investors, both of whom may want to negotiate a loan modification. Recognizing such a problem raises the question of a solution. U.S. Representative Maxine Waters recently introduced legislation that would profoundly alter the duties of mortgage servicers. The bill, HR 5679, The Foreclosure Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act of 2008, would prohibit the initiation of a foreclosure if the mortagee or servicer has failed to engage in “reasonable loss mitigation activities.” The bill lays out exactly what counts as loss mitigation and offers up non-binding guidance on standards of affordability for loss mitigation. Servicers would have to report data on their loss mitigation activities, disaggregated by the type of mitigation activity (separately accounting for things like modifications, deeds in lieu of foreclosure, or repayment plans).

The bill also takes aim at the communication problems between servicers and homeowners. The bill requires services to provide a toll-free number that provides borrowers with direct access to a person with the information and authority to fully resolve issues related to loss mitigation and specifies that such a person must be physically located in the United States. Servicers are also required to forward borrower’s information to HUD-certified housing counselors whenever a borrower is 60 days or more overdue.

In the hearing last week on the bill (which you can watch as an archived webcast), Chairwoman Waters kept returning to a fundamental point–mortgage servicing is an unregulated industry. The witness testimony was essentially unanimous that mortgage servicing has a tremendous impact on American families and on the resolution of the current crisis. Of course, the debate was over whether this regulation was the right approach. The bill hasn’t gotten much publicity yet, but I encourage readers who are interested in the foreclosure crisis to take a look and post their feedback.

Why Don’t More Walk Away

posted by Bob Lawless

My buddy, Buce over at Underbelly, has a post up using the concept of option value to help explain why more people are not walking away from their underwater homes. By “underwater,” we’re not talking about Homer Simpson’s imaginary home under the sea, but situations where the mortgage on the residence is more than the value of the residence. A cool, rational economic actor would walk away from the home, leaving the lender to take a loss (assuming the lender has no legal or practical alternative to collect the difference from the homeowner). We’re not seeing that as often as the cool, rational economic model might predict. Buce points out, correctly, that ownership of the house is just like having an option to buy (i.e., pay off the debt and the house is yours) and even underwater options have value. Thus, part of the reason why more people don’t walk away from their homes is because of this option value.

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April 23, 2008 at 10:33 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (10)

Who Speaks for Mortgage “Lenders”?

posted by Adam Levitin

Katie Porter makes an incredibly important point in her recent post about how securitization structures may be impeding mortgage modifications because the ultimate holders of risk on the mortgages are not the ones involved in the modification decision.  Mortgage servicers, who typically hold a small interest (if any) in the loans are the ones making the modification decisions.  When servicers do hold positions in the mortgage-backed securities, they are first lost positions, so the servicers likely takes a loss regardless of a modification or foreclosure, meaning that their interests are not aligned with the other MBS holders.

Let me take Katie’s post a step further and suggest that the relevant voices on the lending side of the mortgage market have not been heard.  The ultimate risk on mortgages is held by mortgage-backed securities holders, private mortgage insurers, and pool-level bond insurers.  These parties have been entirely absent from the conversation on modification and bankruptcy reform.

Continue reading “Who Speaks for Mortgage “Lenders”?” »

Negotiating with the Mortgage Company

posted by Katie Porter

At the heart of a loan modification is communication between a creditor and a debtor that leads to an agreement on new contract terms. If the debtor cannot get reach a person with authority to negotiate, a modification won’t be possible. If the creditor can’t get the debtor to return its calls or read its mail, a modification also won’t be possible. The communication problems in today’s securitized mortgage market are very different than during past real estate downturns, such as the Midwest farm crisis of the 1980s or the wave of foreclosures in the 1930s. Why? Because of the widespread use of mortgage servicers, third-party agents who collect payments from borrowers and remit them to the mortgage note holders (usually investors, often via a trust). Mortgage servicers are responsible for enforcing defaults, including pursuing foreclosures, and for engaging in loss mitigation. Gone are the days of sitting down with the bank that originated your loan and negotiating a new deal. Why am I making this very basic point? Because I am concerned that policymakers, including legislators, judges, and regulators still do not understand the barrier that loan servicing presents to voluntary or consensual loan modification.

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April 12, 2008 at 5:38 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (8)

UST Turned Loose on Countrywide

posted by Adam Levitin

The UST has been turned loose on Countrywide. The United States Trustee has sought to conduct discovery on Countrywide as part of a motion for sanctions against Countrywide for abusing the bankruptcy process by filing claims that included fees Countrywide knew were not authorized. (See Katie Porter’s article on this troubling phenomenon here.) Countrywide sought to squash the discovery motion. Yesterday, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Countrywide’s motion. The bankruptcy court was unimpressed by Countrywide’s slippery slope argument that this will open up the door to discovery on the entire lending industry. I have to think, though, that if anythign shocking comes out of discovery, trustees (and debtors) elsewhere might think about taking a closer look at creditors’ claims. The decision can be found here.

April 2, 2008 at 8:13 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (2)

Overoptimism and Subprime Mortgages

posted by Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman

Beyond all the news on the causes of, and policy responses to the current US economic crisis focusing almost solely on financial markets, it’s worth paying more attention to causes and policy responses for households.  One household-level cause fits with the implications of a host of other evidence about credit choices: consumer overoptimism.

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March 19, 2008 at 12:40 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (11)

Home Equity Shoe Dropping

posted by John Pottow

Something that I had been wondering about re: the mortgage meltdown has been home equity loans.  We’ve all been focusing on home mortgages (starting with sub-prime, but slipping up to Alt-A and conventionals), but what I was curious about was home equity lines: are those going into default too?  The answer, it seems, is yes.  In just today’s Wall Street Journal, Robin Sidel reports that charge-offs on home equity lines are doubling.  J.P. Morgan Chase predicts first-quarter write-offs of $450 million (up from $248 million prior period) on its $95 billion portfolio.  Delinquency rates are also up too, to over 4%.

The rub with these loans will be on under-water mortgage homes.  The home equity lines, I suspect, are second liens to the PMSI mortgagee, so for the many homes where the superior-lien mortgage gobbles up most of the value of the home, will this result in foreclosures, or just losses?  Either way, more bad news I guess.

March 13, 2008 at 1:50 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

One in Ten

posted by Elizabeth Warren

The latest numbers are out:  One in ten homeowners has no equity in the family home. The data show that about 15% will be below water if prices continue to slide, owing more than their homes are worth.

So what’s the plan here?  One in ten homeowners could just walk away right now. Indeed, most of them, if they were the rational maximizers so prominently featured in classical economic analysis, would stop paying now, put the money in a savings account and wait the 90 days or two years or whatever until the lender could force them out by foreclosure.  In non-recourse states, they could just pocket the money and walk away free and clear.  In other states, they might need bankruptcy or a last-ditch deal with the lender for a short sale. The economics of the deal shift when the homeowner has no equity to protect.

If they walk, the national–and world–economy will seize up.  The investors who hold those mortgages can avoid that if they are willing to share the pain and acknowledge that their loans are only partially secured. Like practical lenders have done for thousands of years, they could decide that getting a steady, partial payment is better than no payment at all.  So far, however, the investors are holding tight, even as Fed Chairman Bernake asks them please please please renegotiate these crazy mortgages.

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March 6, 2008 at 3:13 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (25)

Reexamining Non-Judicial Foreclosures

posted by Adam Levitin

Katie Porter’s posts and scholarship about illegal fees tacked on by mortgage servicers to defaulted mortgages raise an interesting question:  why aren’t states reconsidering non-judicial foreclosure?  Non-judicial foreclosure is generally faster and cheaper than judicial foreclosure, which is a good thing, at least for the foreclosing lender as it reduces loan losses.  And as Karen Pence has shown, there is a reduced supply of credit in states with judicial foreclosure.  But as the name implies, non-judicial foreclosure lacks court oversight, and this raises the possibilities for abuse.

[UPDATED LINK 3.4.08 at 5:06pm]

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HOPE Now January Report

posted by Adam Levitin

HOPE Now, the government-encouraged alliance of mortgage servicers assembled to facilitate mortgage workouts, has released its January 2008 numbers. There’s good and bad news in these numbers.

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Surprise!!! You’ve Earned a Discharge AND a Foreclosure

posted by Katie Porter

Tomorrow, the Senate is expected to vote on the Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008, Title IV of which would permit bankruptcy courts to modify home mortgages in certain ways if the loan and the debtor met specified criteria. We’ve described that idea before, but the bill has crucial implications for bankruptcy that are not related to loan modification. Specifically, take a look at section 421, which proposes a solution to a problem with current bankruptcy law. Many Chapter 13 debtors pay for 3 to 5 years on a repayment plan, doing everything the law requires of them, and only a week or two later, face a foreclosure. How does this happen? Because the mortgage servicers frequently assess charges during a bankruptcy case, but fail to disclose these fees. Courts don’t approve them; trustees don’t adjust the debtor’s payments to account for them; and debtors aren’t even given notice that these charges are piling up. Instead of emerging from bankruptcy with a fresh start, homeowners find themselves defending a foreclosure or having to immediately pony up hundreds or thousands of dollars. Just last week, Judge Brendan Shannon of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court addressed this issue, challenging lenders to disagree that these undisclosed “surprise” fees don’t “frustrate” bankruptcy’s home-saving purpose. The Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 tackles this problem by requiring mortgage companies to disclose all fees within the earlier of 1 year of assessing the charges or 60 days before the end of the bankruptcy. The law also specifies that a lender may only charge such fees if they are lawful, reasonable, and provided for in the contract. It’s sad that this latter requirement is even necessary–it essentially just prohibits mortgage servicers from violating existing law by overcharging consumers, a problem that an increasing body of case law and research suggests occurs with alarming regularity. I see lots of reasons why permitting bankruptcy courts to modify mortgages may be the best comprehensive solution to the foreclosure crisis, but I also hope Congress takes a hard look at the rest of the bill and considers its overall importance. If consumers do their part in bankruptcy and make every payment required by law, the system should honor its promise to give them a financial fresh start.

Webcast on Foreclosure Crisis

posted by Katie Porter

The Cleveland City Council is webcasting a foreclosure forum on Wednesday February 27th from 10am-1pm. Here’s the link to watch. The event is timed to coincide with the visits of the Presidential candidates and national media to Ohio. Senator Obama is sending adviser and law professor, Mark Alexander, and Senator Clinton’s representative will be Fred Hochberg. McCain has not yet identified who, if anyone, will attend. The foreclosure situation in Cuyahoga County may be the worst in nation, or certainly is a leading contender for that sad distinction. The city is taking some novel approaches, as I learned from Prof. Creola Johnson’s presentation at a symposium on Subprime Foreclosures at the University of Utah College of Law earlier this week. I was particularly interested in the problem of abandoned properties, and the practice of many lenders to not file deeds after purchasing a property at a foreclosure sale. That practice makes it very difficult for the city to figure out who is responsible for the upkeep on abandoned properties. The speakers at the Forum will include Cleveland Mayor Jackson, County Treasurer Jim Rokakis, Housing Court Judge Ray Pianka and several community organizations.

February 26, 2008 at 4:32 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (0)

Vote on Tuesday

posted by Elizabeth Warren

The pending bankruptcy amendment that would let judges make a downward adjustment on mortgages when the loan exceeds the value of the property goes to a vote in the Senate tomorrow. It will take 60 votes to push the bill forward.  The mortgage lenders think they can block it, giving the Republicans a chance to kill the bill through filibuster.

Larry Summers weighed in via his column in the Economist.  He supports the bill as a way to create a mechanism to get the borrowers into deals that are good for the borrowers and cheaper for the lenders.  He points out the the current ideas of jawboning the lenders just isn’t working.  But he seems to be having some trouble with the details of how bankruptcy works.

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February 25, 2008 at 6:26 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (5)

What the Foreclosure Mess Tells Us About Private Student Loan Dischargeability

posted by Adam Levitin

The most recent attempt to roll back some of the BAPCPA’s limitations on the scope of the bankruptcy discharge seems to have faltered in the House. The House passed an education bill, but without a proposed amendment that would have made private student loans dischargeable in bankruptcy, as they were before October 2005, was voted down. A Senate bill (S.1561) sponsored by Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) that proposes making the private loans dischargeable is still in committee. (For a discussion of the legislation see here.)

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30-70%? — Probably Not the Real Rate of Mortgage Fraud

posted by Bob Lawless

I’ve been catching up on some reading and again found the statistic that 30% to 70% of early payment defaults on home mortgages can be linked to significant misrepresentations borrowers made on their loan applications. This most recent time I saw the statistic cited as coming from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Enough! Can we stop this?

This statistic is misleading and when presented as a fact makes it seem like there is an easy solution to the mortgage crisis, which would be to let the fraudfeasors get the fate they deserve. If those numbers seem too high to you, it’s because they likely are.

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OTS … ?4U … WITW

posted by Bob Lawless

Office of Thrift Supervision, I have a question for you. What in the world is this?

CNN reported that the OTS is in the early stages of a plan that would give some lenders an incentive to write down mortgages where the value of the debt now exceeds the value of the home. According to CNN, if a home was worth, say, $100,000 and if the mortgage was $120,000, the lender could write down the mortgage to $100,000 and get a $20,000 warrant. If the house later sold for more than $100,000, the warrant would entitle the lender to receive up to value of the $20,000 warrant plus interest. The OTS also is suggesting that these warrants could trade on a secondary market. The idea is the lender would be able to share in any recovery in the value of the housing market.

I don’t get it.

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February 21, 2008 at 10:51 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (5)

A New Regulatory Tool for Financial Stability

posted by Christian E. Weller

Economists tend to be pretty good at pointing out what is currently going wrong with the economy. But we tend to be rather hamstrung at offering solutions. In the current crisis, public policy needs to achieve three things: 1) help troubled homeowners and declining communities, 2) maintain liquidity and stability in the credit market, and 3) prevent another financial crisis of this magnitude from happening again. Lawyers, community activists, consumer advocates, sociologists, among others, have offered a wide array of proposals to address the first two problems. Little has been suggested in ways of addressing the chance of a repeat crisis in the future. Economists in particular are reluctant to go beyond simple proposals that call for more market transparency. A changed regulatory, environment, though, may help to reduce the chance of future financial crises. Specifically, a few economists have proposed a new regulatory tool called asset-based reserve requirements for more than three decades. This tool would allow the regulatory agency, often assumed to be the Fed, to force financial institutions to bear the cost of their investment decisions and not to unload them onto society.

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February 21, 2008 at 6:57 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Fed Cannot Do it All

posted by Christian E. Weller

Many wait for Ben Bernanke and his colleagues at the Fed to save the economy from further turmoil. The reality, though, is that monetary policy is limited in addressing the crisis. In particular, the economy is slowing because the housing boom is over, which was caused and fuelled by deteriorating mortgage quality that resulted from people no longer paying their mortgages. The rise in foreclosures followed higher interest rates on resetting adjustable  rate mortgages, lower incomes in a weakening labor market, and declining home prices that put many mortgages “under water”. Monetary policy can only directly impact interest rates and even there its reach is limited.

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February 20, 2008 at 6:39 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sliding into the Great Deflation

posted by Christian E. Weller

We are headed for the Great Deflation – a period spanning a decade or more of very slow growth, rising unemployment, flat or falling real wages, fewer employer-provided benefits and increasing pressures on government finances.

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February 19, 2008 at 6:00 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (13)

Do the Math on Recession and Foreclosures

posted by Christian E. Weller

Thanks to CreditSlips for inviting me to be a guest blogger and to share my views on credit and the economy.

By now, it’s obvious that the housing crisis is dragging down the economy. For the past eight quarters, the declining activity in the housing market dampened growth on average by 0.9 percentage points below where it otherwise would have been. This is the largest housing induced subtraction from economic growth since 1975.

Some observers argue that this is just a natural correction of the market and that policy makers should let market forces play themselves out. The logic is that a nice, quick recession will get rid of the debt overhang by forcing people to default. Once banks’ balance sheets are free of the excess loans, the economy will get a clean slate to start over again as a rejuvenated banking sector will once again pave the way for innovation and production and not for speculation and Wall Street greed. The way it is portrayed, it almost sounds like a day at the spa for the US economy.

The situation, though, is far more serious. A recession that would get rid of the debt overhang would have to be very deep, especially since the mortgage foreclosure rate would have to jump to unimaginably high rates.

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February 18, 2008 at 6:00 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (8)

Let Them Eat Crumbs

posted by Elizabeth Warren

The Treasury Department has yet another voluntary plan to fix the mortgage meltdown.  This one gives families an extra thirty days to pack their belongings before they lose their homes to foreclosure.  For the 2 million families estimated to go into foreclosure this year, the mortgage industry, backed by the current administration says, in effect, “Let them eat crumbs.”

The administration plan is, once again, voluntary, and only a half-dozen lenders have agreed.  What about the teaser-rate and sleaze-ball mortgages sold by everyone else? I guess those home owners had better pack fast.

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Will the Mortgage Industry Fix the Mortgage Mess Itself? A Look at Project Lifeline

posted by Adam Levitin

The mortgage industry has been arguing against bankruptcy reform legislation that would permit the court-supervised modification of single-family principal home mortgages in bankruptcy. The industry argues that permitting mortgage modification in bankruptcy would result in higher interest rates and that its private efforts will solve the problem. In an earlier post and in a working paper, I have shown that we are unlikely to see higher interest rates as a result of allowing bankruptcy modification. Here, though, I want to take issue with the mortgage industry’s claim that its private efforts will solve the problem.

Hopefully the mortgage industry is correct about this. But there is good reason to doubt the efficacy of the industry’s efforts. To date, the mortgage industry’s efforts to fix the foreclosure crisis have been a lot of sizzle, but not much steak. Unfortunately, this seems to be the case with Project Lifeline, the latest half-measure to come out of the mortgage industry. As I explain below, the very structure of Project Lifeline means that homeowners in a significant number of states will be unable to take advantage of Project Lifeline’s meager offering because it will kick in only after their homes have been sold in foreclosure.

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Mortgages at the Dem’s Debate

posted by Adam Levitin

To my surprise, the second thing out of Hilary Clinton’s mouth, after “health care,” when asked about the differences between her and Barack Obama, was “mortgages.” It’s about time that the foreclosure crisis is getting prime billing in the presidential race.

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Homeowners in Trouble–Don’t be an industry statistic

posted by Katie Porter

The Mortgage Bankers Association released a study this month that touts the efforts of mortgage servicers and lenders to assist borrowers. The industry asserts that it “took major steps” to “help those borrowers who could be helped.” Therein, lies the catch. While apparently relying on self-reporting by mortgage servicers (an industry facing numerous accusations of misconduct (see here and here and here)), even assuming accurate data, the study’s methodology gives a big boost to the mortgage industry. How? The study begins by excluding as beyond help all loans on properties that servicers could not confirm the house was occupied by its owner (18%). It also excludes all loans in which the borrower defaulted despite a previous payment plan (29%). Notably, there is no evidence on the parameters of those plans–were debtors given an extra week to cure their mortgages or were these serious modification efforts? Given what we know about modification efforts from public securities filings, there is no way 29% of loans would meet a strong criteria of previous repayment plan. Most disturbingly though, from a policy standpoint, the industry points the finger directly at borrowers. It excludes 29% of loans from the group where it asserts modification is feasible because the “borrower would not respond.” In his post on the House hearing on the mortgage modification bill, Prof. Adam Levitin reported on a witness’ testimony that families in financial trouble may not respond to phone calls or open mail from creditors. My advice to homeowners–talk to your servicer or open mail from them. Better yet, contact them affirimatively to ask for a loan modification and keep records of your efforts in so doing. Don’t be an industry statistic! Beyond this practice advice, the fact that industry says it can’t reach 3 in 10 borrowers has important policy implications–including for the fate of the bankruptcy modification bill.

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January 30, 2008 at 5:31 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (3)

Worth Reading–Moral Responsibility to Pay

posted by Bob Lawless

Two very thoughtful posts by Buce at Underbelly are worth reading. Both get at the question of whether “can pay” debtors are acting wrongfully when they don’t pay. The first post looks at the issue generally. The second post is a followup discussing the mortgage foreclosure problems in California and whether banks should expect debtors to pay more than they are legally obligated to pay. Good stuff.

House Judiciary Cramdown Hearing

posted by Adam Levitin

A great thing about teaching in Washington, D.C., is the ability to drop in on legislative hearings. Today I went to a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing on the cramdown bill, also known as the Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007(HR 3609). A report is below the break.

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More Bogus Numbers from the Mortgage Industry

posted by Adam Levitin

The past few months have seen story after story about fraud in the mortgage industry.  Now we’re seeing a new type of fraud–mortgage lobbying fraud.  The Mortgage Bankers Association has been claiming the proposed bankruptcy reform legislation that would significantly roll back the special treatment given to mortgage lenders in chapter 13 bankruptcies would result in residential mortgage interest rates rising 1.5 to 2 percent.  (Somehow this number started at 2% and has drifted down to 1.5% without any explanation.)  The MBA’s number is pure and demonstrable hokum.  As Joshua Goodman, a Columbia University economist and I show in a new working paper, permitting bankruptcy modification is likely to have little or no impact on mortgage interest rates or origination volumes.  Keep reading below the break for the proof.

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Discussions of the Kind That I Stimulated By My First Post

posted by James White

Discussions of the kind that I stimulated by my suggestions on Monday (about what Congress might do) reveal widely different assumptions about the number and type of debtors that will default. Shouldn’t we look for the data? The data might keep conservatives from falling off the cliff to the right and the liberals from falling off on the other side- at last that is my hope. So who are the debtors and how many will default? Those are the questions for investors, legislators and lenders. But the answers are not easy to find, and, with incomplete data, each of us is the captive of his political bias. What about the defaulting debt and about the deserts of the debtors (Fools all? Every one defrauded?)

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Servicing Kickbacks Alleged in Class Action

posted by Katie Porter

Last week, a class action lawsuit (Harris v. Fidelity National) was filed against Fidelity National Information Services, a huge player in the billion dollar world of mortgage servicing. “What? I’ve never heard of them,” you say. Fidelity is the company that provides default servicing to most of the large residential mortgage servicers. Their role is a shadowy one; unless you’ve delved deeply into how consumer mortgages are serviced, you probably weren’t aware of their existence–much less how they may be driving up costs for consumers. Foreclosure petitions, proofs of claims, and bankruptcy court motions never bear Fidelity’s name (instead they are signed by the regular servicers or by local counsel retained by the servicers.) But despite its invisibility, Fidelity is almost always part of the action in foreclosures or bankruptcy cases.

The lawsuit alleges that Fidelity receives illegal kickbacks from attorneys who work under contract with them. The exhibits to the class action are clear. Fidelity bills its clients–the servicers–for certain fees– for example, $100 to review a bankruptcy plan. The servicer includes those fees as due and owing on bankruptcy proofs of claims, many of which appear only as “attorneys fees” or “postpetition charges.” However, Fidelity requires attorneys to let it “retain” $50 of that $100. Fidelty characterizes these as “admin fees” paid by the attorney to Fidelity. The big problem with this practice is that bankruptcy law requires full disclosure of where the debtor’s money is going. If the service is getting the debtor to pay these fees, the bankruptcy court should be approving those charges and who is going to receive the debtor’s money. At least, that’s how the class action has framed the legal issues in the case.

One final note: the schedule of Fidelty’s fees includes a line item for “Drafting Missing Documents.” Hmmmm . . . If documents are missing, they are missing. I don’t see how “drafting” can appropriately play into this. It sounds like more evidence of “recreating” mortgage servicing documents like the actions by Countrywide exposed in the In re Hill case.

January 24, 2008 at 9:04 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (6)

Congress’ Response to the Mortgage Mess

posted by James White

Eric Sevareid once remarked that a “chief cause of problems is solutions.”

From a libertarian perspective at least, I suspect that we will find “problems” in the “solutions” that Congress will enact to solve the sub prime mortgage mess. At this point it seems inevitable that the current Congress (and, even more so, the one that will likely sit in 2009) will be moved by heartrending stories of foreclosure of citizens’ residences at the hands of mortgagees who have charged excessive rates, misrepresented the terms of the loan and induced the debtors to take on too much debt.

It seems certain that Congress will allow stripping down of mortgage liens in bankruptcy. Doubtless Congress will try to shackle mortgage brokers with expensive certification and criminal liability. It may also go beyond abolition of holder in due course status for mortgage note holders to force persons in the chain of title of the notes to bear some of the credit loss that occurs when the debtor defaults. If Congress can find a way to do it constitutionally, Congress may also mandate some form mortgage modification. Congress might even take up my friend John’s foolish idea that lending too generously be a tort. Congress will justify the legislation by anecdotal testimony in televised hearings from pitiful wretches who knew not what they were doing.

If my lugubrious predictions prove true, there will be a measurable–possibly quite large–impact on the market. Such rules will make mortgage lending less profitable to everyone in the system-so the number of mortgages written will decline and those that are written will be marginally more expensive. It will winnow the number of mortgage brokers and so remove some who have committed fraud in writing mortgages. It will make investors upstream think twice about buying a debt that carries not only a fraud claim but also the possibility of tort liability for too generous lending, and even a lasting stain (for debt liability) that cannot be removed by assignment to another.

I am quite clear about what Congressman Paul would do to solve this crisis- nothing. He would note that the interest rate on 30 year mortgages in late January 2008 was lower than any time since mid 2005. He would point out that many mortgage brokers have gone into bankruptcy and that the gushing market for mortgaged backed securities has gone dry. He would point out that Countrywide rewrote more than 83,000 mortgages to alleviate pressure on its debtors in 2007 and that it expects to modify even larger numbers of mortgages this year. In short he would argue that Darwin’s rules are already at work and that, left to itself, the market will cure the excesses that we have observed. In his view adding harsh legislation on top of the market’s Darwinian response would cause the number of home loans to decline well below the optimum number.

By now you will have understood that I am sympathetic to the libertarian position, and I wonder whether the debtors’ friends in Congress have a covert agenda, namely to keep those with poor credit from taking on debt even when these debtors are fully informed of the risks and costs and quite willing to bear them. To protect consumers from fraud is worthy, but is it worthy to bar an informed consumer from economic behavior that Congress thinks too risky? What do you think?

January 21, 2008 at 12:47 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (22)

Will the “Real” Anti-Foreclosure Mr. Paulson Please Stand Up?

posted by Katie Porter

Yesterday’s front page story in the Wall Street Journal was not the usual Paulson story about subprime mortgages—blah, blah Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has organized mortgage companies to make blah, blah, blah unenforceable promises to offer short-term help to blah, blah homeowners. (Can you see that I share Prof. Elizabeth Warren’s skepticism about the “Sandbag” plan?)

This story about Paulson and foreclosures was much more interesting. It profiled John Paulson (no relation), a hedge fund manager who bet big in 2005 that the mortgage market was heading sharply south. Paulson’s take home pay in 2007 was reputedly $3 to $4 billion dollars (WOW!). What is he doing with all this money? Well, he’s given $15 million of it to the Center for Responsible Lending to fund legal assistance to families facing foreclosure. This is a chunk of change, even for someone with his paycheck, and it is a momumental gift for direct legal services, which typically struggles along on small gifts. Another surprise–John Paulson says in the WSJ that “bankruptcy is the best way to keep homeowners in the home without costing the government any money.” This bowled me over; a Wall Street maven backing the pending legislation that would let consumers modify their home mortgages in bankruptcy! I’d say this Paulson won’t be making the speaker’s list at the next Mortgage Bankers Association meeting, which has strenously opposed the legislation. They’ll have to content themselves with the Treasury Secretary.

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January 16, 2008 at 5:10 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (0)

Mortgage Magic–Recreating Servicing Documents

posted by Katie Porter

The latest uproar about mortgage servicing in bankruptcy is an admission by Countrywide that it “recreated” documents related to the servicing of a consumer’s home loan. The short story is that Countrywide says a debtor’s monthly mortgage payment changed during the Chapter 13 plan and that the debtor didn’t make the increased payments. The problem is that the debtor, her attorney, and the trustee say that they were never told about the increase in payments, which is purportedly due to changing escrow requirements. Countrywide gave the debtor letters showing that the amounts changed; those letters were dated 2003, 2004, and 2007. The problem is that those letters were not copies of actual letters from 2003, 2004, and 2007. As Countrywide admitted, it “recreated” these letters as “evidence” of the change in the monthly payment. The judge had a few questions about that practice:

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Forget the “Foreclosure Investigator”–File a Lawsuit!

posted by Katie Porter

Elizabeth Warren’s recent post asked “What Can a City Do?” about subprime lending. The post prompted many thoughtful comments, both on Credit Slips and on the Calculated Risk blog. While readers were discussing the merits of various ideas, including a city-appointed “Foreclosure Investigator,” the city of Baltimore took a much more aggressive tact–it sued Wells Fargo on January 8th. Calling the city a “second victim” after the homeowners, Baltimore filed suit in U.S. District Court alleging that Wells Fargo engaged in predatory and discrimatory subprime mortgage lending. Wells Fargo denies the allegations, which focus on purported steering of black homeowners into high cost loans. The Associated Press reports that “two-thirds of Wells Fargo’s foreclosures occurred in neighborhoods that are more than 60 percent black.” The city attorneys apparently analyzed foreclosure data, finding that while most lenders had higher foreclosure rates in majority-black communities, that according to the AP, “Wells Fargo stood out having the most glarity racial disparity.”

I believe this is the first lawsuit filed by a city as plaintiff to grow out of the current subprime loan crisis, and it seems sure to be controversial. Past Credit Slips guestblogger and law professor, Kathleen Engel, has an article on SSRN for free download entitled “Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending?” that addresses many of issues that the Baltimore v. Wells Fargo suit will raise.

January 9, 2008 at 4:43 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (8)

What Can a City Do?

posted by Elizabeth Warren

Because subprime lending was not evenly spread around the country (or even around a state or city), individual neighborhoods are bearing the brunt of the meltdown.  When several homes in one community go into foreclosure, a neighborhood can rapidly shift from a safe, comfortable area with well-tended lawns to a place where no one wants to live.  Mayors are on the front lines in dealing with the fallout.

Like most academics, we at Credit Slips tend to talk about what the federal government could do to deal with the subprime crisis.  The feds have the power, if not the will, to make some big changes.  But what about mayors?  Can anything be done at the city level? This isn’t an academic question, so put on your thinking caps and volunteer some ideas.  Here’s mine:

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January 7, 2008 at 11:30 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (14)

Is This Just a “Sub-Prime” Mortgage Crisis?

posted by Adam Levitin

The current home mortgage crisis is often referred to as a “subprime” crisis. That’s useful shorthand, but it really isn’t accurate and unfortunately obfuscates the scope of the problem. The mortgage problem isn’t just limited to subprime. It extends beyond it in (at least) two ways.

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Does the Chapter 13 Filing Rate Tell Us Anything About Mortgage Foreclosures?

posted by Bob Lawless

A few days ago, I had the bright idea of looking at the chapter 13 filing rate in the different states and seeing if that told us anything about what might be happening with home mortgage foreclosures. Generally speaking, homeowners often will find it easier to save a home in chapter 13, and thus changes in the chapter 13 rate could give us some understanding of the financial distress being caused by the home mortgage crisis. It’s a nice theory, but in practice the data are unilluminating on that point. There is great variation from state-to-state in the chapter 13 rate, making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from the data.

Nationally, 38.8% of all November 2007 bankruptcy filings were chapter 13s, but the table shows the national figures masks considerable state variation. (The data are courtesy of AACER.) Bankruptcy experts will not find the state variation very surprising. In an 1993 article, Professor (and upcoming Credit Slips guest blogger) Jean Braucher documented how consumer bankruptcy attorneys can influence chapter choice. (See Braucher, 1993. “Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,” American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 67:501-83.) On the heels of that article, Professors Teresa Sullivan, (Credit Slips blogger) Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook described important variations in bankruptcy practice that could not be explained by difference in formal rules but rather were likely the byproduct of differing cultures by local professionals. (See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, 1994. “The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 17:801-865.) From these studies and others, we know that local legal culture plays a significant role in bankruptcy chapter choice.

The persistence of local legal culture makes it difficult to use a snapshot of differences in state bankruptcy filings rates or the percentage of chapter 13 cases as a proxy for the financial distress of homeowners. To make such a measure meaningful, one would have to follow the filing rate of particular states across time. In statistics-speak, we need longitudinal (over time) not cross-sectional (across observations) data. Bankruptcy filing data by state are difficult to get and assemble, especially going back in time–why that should be probably should be the subject of another post–making the task beyond what I have time to devote to a blog post. Thus, I’m going to say that we can’t say a whole lot about the mortgage foreclosure crisis from the chapter 13 data.

Buce Is the World

posted by Bob Lawless

Our correspondent, Buce over at Underbelly, wonders exactly how does one say “adjustable-rate mortgage” in Czech. Don’t kid yourself that consumer indebtedness is uniquely American.

On a different note, Buce also describes the similarities he sees between today’s mortgage crisis and the fraud fandango of the early 1970s. It’s not that Buce was around to see that, but he’s heard others talk of it. Buce’s post is worth reading. It reminds us that the fundamentals of our problems are not new, just the same dynamic with with different labels. Everything old is new again, especially when we’re talking about creative ways used to convince someone to part with his money.

Home Mortgage Crunch: Is it Better to Have Loved and Lost?

posted by Nathalie Martin

There is SO MUCH interesting on this site and in the TPM Cafe’s posts today…not sure this stripdown thing is at the forefront of people’s concerns, but….here are two more thoughts, relating to the economics of home mortgage stripdown and to the comparative treatment of second mortgages. The long-term economic ramifications of allowing or not allowing stripdown are important, but I do not think they weigh against allowing home mortgage stripdown. Adam Levitin just posted on TPM Cafe about interest rates. Great post! What about that other idea out there that allowing home mortgage stripdown will dry up home lending. First, I doubt it.  Second, maybe it is ok, even if it is true. If part of the goal is to improve the value and predictability of investments in these products, and to lend only to people who will likely pay the loan, more careful lending (and fewer loans) could be a good thing. In other words, it may indeed have been better to never have loved……That does not mean we shouldn’t help those who are in the bad loans. They may have spent all of their savings on a bad deal, and now be deserving of help. Second home mortgages in Chapter 13?  I am not sure but I think Prof. Scarberry is saying that under the current Chapter 13, borrowers can strip down the second home mortgage, but only if they can pay the whole mortgage off in the 3-5 year plan period. If a bill is passed that allows the primary home loan to be stripped down and stretched out, he argues, lenders will be treated less advantageously for second home loans. Prof. Scarberry feels this would be a problem, though I am not so sure. I’d like to see all these mortgage holders treated the same, but if we had to favor one over the other, I’d favor the creditor in the second home loan and the borrower in the primary home loan. It seems indefensible that under current law, borrowers might have an easier time saving a vacation home than a primary residence. (I admit, most of the time, borrowers cannot pay the second home mortgage in 3-5 years anyway, but at least theoretically borrowers are more protected on the vacation home than the primary residence). That just seems wrong. (as Bob lawless noted a few weeks back….). Again, if I had to choose between giving people a break on a primary home mortgage and giving them a break on a vacation home mortgage, I’d choose to give the break (and yes, to treat the mortgage lender less favorably) on the primary home loan. But the main thing is…..The treatment of vacation or second home mortgages should not bear at all on what we do with the overall issue of home mortgage stripdown. I mean, how often is second mortgage stripdown an issue? Second home mortgages are rare in Chapter 13, are a small percentage of the overall home mortgage market, and do not play a big part in the current crisis. I would just hate to see the tail wag the dog, in other words to allow current second home mortgage treatment (surely an afterthought in bankruptcy policy in any case), to direct our decision on how to treat primary home mortgages.

December 19, 2007 at 7:44 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (1)

Equal Footings

posted by Bob Lawless

Professor Mark Scarberry of Pepperdine University posted a comment taking issue with my statement that the proposed mortgage stripdown bills would do nothing more than put home mortgage lenders on an “equal footing” with other secured lenders in chapter 13. Given the criticisms of Scarberry’s congressional testimony in this space, at the least I should put his own words on an equal footing. Here is a link to Scarberry’s full testimony for our readers to examine it for themselves.

I appreciate Professor Scarberry’s engagement on this issue. Heck, I appreciate it when any one even bothers to read this blog, let alone post comments. It looks like that the two of us will just have to disagree. Scarberry states that “no other stripped down secured debt can be paid off over more than the five year maximum life of the chapter 13 plan.” I just disagree. Section 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code clearly allows a debtor to maintain payments over the life of the original mortgage, beyond the 5-year provision. That is true even if the plan proposes stripdown of the mortgage. (See here for an earlier explanation of the concept of “stripdown” in bankruptcy.) Thus, I continue to think it quite apt to point out that the pending bills would do nothing more than put home mortgage lenders on an equal footing with other secured lenders.

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December 17, 2007 at 12:21 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink | Comments (4)

More on the Home Mortgage Stripdown Bills…Why We Should Not Hurt People for No Gain to Anyone Else

posted by Nathalie Martin

Yesterday I posted on the topic of the essential nature of secured debt and why we should be consistent in how we treat it across the board. Today, I wanted to address some more specific points brought out in ABI Resident Scholar Mark Scarberry’s testimony before Congress last week. The purpose of the post is to support passing a law allowing home mortgage stripdowns, with few limitations.

One argument Professor Scarberry made is that now that some personal property is excluded from stripdown, it would be wrong to treat home mortgage holders less advantageously than personal property loans. I totally agree that this would be wrong, but reach a different conclusion. Stripdown should be allowed in all undersecured cases, consistent with state law principles. Both the home mortgage stripdown exception and the 2005 limitations on stripdown are equally out of line with basic bankruptcy and state law collections principles. (see yesterday’s post). We can and should work on fixing this after the home mortgage crisis has passed, if not immediately.

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December 13, 2007 at 6:55 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity | Permalink

New Twist on “Making a Federal Case Out of It”

posted by Katie Porter

Have you heard that expression, “Don’t make a federal case out of it?” It’s usually used to caution against blowing something out of proportion. Two recent decisions from federal courts in Ohio explained why the courts have an obligation to take issues of standing seriously and made clear that if you want to make a federal case out of it, you have to follow the federal court’s rules. As Elizabeth Warren explained, the decisions are a reminder that the law matters. And in federal court, at least some judges are going to require the lenders to follow **all** the rules, an outcome that the lenders apparently asserted was not the situation in state court.

But why are these foreclosures in federal court? Foreclosure is a state law action, and a vast majority of such actions are filed in state courts. Apparently, the holders of the mortgages (or should I say “putative” holders of the mortgages?) are frustrated that some state courts in Ohio and other jurisdictions are taking a long time to adjudicate foreclosure cases. The cause of the delay is that the state courts are overwhelmed by the sheer number of foreclosure actions being filed. In many jurisdictions, foreclosures go to a specially-designated division of state court and as foreclosure rates have climbed rapidly, these judges and their staffs can’t keep up with the backlog.

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Debt settlement: A costly escape not always the best solution

9 Dec


Negotiating away your bills is legal, but it may not be your best solution. And sometimes, hiring a professional to help you isn’t as good an idea as doing it yourself.

If you’re drowning in unpaid bills and desperately looking for a way out, chances are you’ve come across an offer that sounds something like this: For a fee, a professional debt-settlement company will help rid you of your debt for as little as half the amount you owe.

Sounds like a scam? Or like you’re finally getting the break you deserve?

The answer may surprise you. Debt settlement is, in fact, a perfectly legal solution for consumers who are in deep and seeking an alternative to bankruptcy. But having a debt-settlement company do the legwork for you is fraught with risk, not to mention outrageous fees.

Here’s what you need to know about debt settlement and the companies that claim to do it for you:

The basics

It’s a little-known fact that when you fall further and further behind on your payments, creditors would much rather agree to settle your debts than have you file bankruptcy and not get paid at all, says debt expert Gerri Detweiler, author of “The Ultimate Credit Handbook”.

In exchange for an agreed-upon one-time payment — typically, between 20% and 75% of what you owe — the creditor forgives the rest of your debt and starts reporting it to the credit bureaus as settled. Meanwhile, you’ll need to put money aside toward the settlement and stop making payments to your creditors. On your credit reports, the balances of settled debts will show $0. However, any previous history of delinquent payments or charge-offs will remain on your report.

Not surprisingly, creditors don’t like to advertise debt settlement. They also make it an extremely difficult solution to pursue. As a rule, creditors won’t negotiate with consumers who are current on their bills, often refusing to discuss settlements unless you’re at least three to six months behind, explains Detweiler. That means dodging collections calls while trying to save up the cash for a settlement.

If you’re working with several creditors — you’d typically tackle the debts one at a time as you collect the money to pay them off — it’s hard, if not impossible to know which creditor might agree to settle earlier than others. “There’s an art to it,” Detweiler notes.

The problem with debt-settlement companies

With that in mind, it would be great to have an experienced, knowledgeable debt-settlement company hold your hand through the process, right? Not really.

Once you sign up with a company, chances are you’ll pay dearly for its services, says Deanne Loonin, a staff attorney with the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) who has investigated the practices of debt-settlement companies.

Outrageous fees


Just how much will you pay? Good luck finding that out.

“I’ve never seen a company that’s given a straight answer,” says Loonin. The industry’s fees and fee structures are all over the place. Some companies charge a percentage of the total debt — typically 15% or 18% — that’s paid before you start accumulating savings. Others charge a percentage of the debt savings — usually 25% — once you settle, plus an initial sign-up fee and monthly service charges. Then there are those that charge a flat monthly fee throughout the length of the program.

Even the industry admits figuring out the costs is a challenge. “I have seen every kind of (fee) model you can think of,” says Jenna Keehnen, the executive director of the U.S. Organizations for Bankruptcy Alternatives (USOBA), an industry trade group. “It’s very confusing.”

Worse than confusing, it’s prohibitively expensive, says Katie Porter, a professor of bankruptcy law at the University of Iowa. She recently came across an offer to settle $33,551 in debt that projected a $5,032 service fee that was to be paid in monthly installments. Only after the service fee was paid off, two years later, did the client actually start saving for the settlement.

“That $5,000 buys a substantial amount of attorney time,” she says. “You can get a consumer (or bankruptcy) attorney to represent you and help with your debt problems for a lot less than that.”

Questionable services

What does a debt-settlement company do for you? In theory, it’s supposed to help you negotiate your debts. In practice though, that doesn’t really happen, says Porter. During the two or more years that you’re saving money — typically in an escrow account that the debt-settlement company has access to — the company does nothing but withdraw fees.

“A lot of consumers think they’ve taken care of the problem after contacting a company, but the reality is the debt-settlement company hasn’t settled anything in the beginning,” Porter says.
The companies also claim that they’ll help you dodge collections calls. But referring collections calls to your debt-settlement company often backfires, says Leslie Linfield, the executive director at the Institute for Financial Literacy, an organization that provides pre-bankruptcy counseling.

“Many creditors, once they know a client is working with a debt-settlement company, will escalate the account,” she notes. That means sending it to a collections agency sooner or even suing you. And when a creditor takes legal action, the debt-settlement companies drop the account: They don’t have the right to give legal advice or represent you in court.

High dropout rates

While there’s no independent research on the average success rate of debt-settlement programs, anecdotal evidence shows many consumers drop out before the company reaches a settlement with their creditors, Linfield says. “As you talk to bankruptcy attorneys you’ll hear horror stories of clients who paid thousands of dollars to a company and they’re still in the exact same place,” she says.

Consider what happened at National Consumer Council, which was shut down by the Federal Trade Commission in 2004 on accusations of falsely claiming nonprofit status. The company’s court records show that only 1.4% of the consumers who signed up for the program ever completed it. Nearly half — 42.9% — dropped out, paying an average of $1,780 in fees and saving $966 in their escrow accounts.

Secrets of the trade

Here’s what debt-settlement companies might not tell you:

Debt settlement may not be right for you. Debt settlement is a niche solution that’s right only for a small segment of the population. You could be a good candidate for debt settlement if you’re heading toward bankruptcy but don’t qualify for filing Chapter 7, Phelan explains. (Under Chapter 7, most of your unsecured debts are written off, but you’ll most likely have to sell some property including your home). “Most people who can qualify for Chapter 7 in all likelihood lack the cash flow to make debt settlement work for them,” he says. Debt settlement, in other words, might be a viable alternative to Chapter 13, which sets up a three- to five-year schedule with your creditors to repay your debts.

Likewise, if you can scrape up the cash to pay off your debts in a debt-management program  where you work with a debt-management company to pay off your balances in full but with lower interest rates, then debt settlement isn’t the best solution.

Your credit will suffer. Creditors don’t settle unless you’re severely behind on your payments. That means one thing: Debt settlement is damaging to your credit. Just how damaging it is depends on your track record. If you’re already behind on payments, your credit will suffer less than if you’ve managed to avoid delinquencies and credit charge-offs.

You could get sued. With bankruptcy, creditors have to stop collections efforts as soon as you file. That’s not the case with debt settlement. Even if you inform your creditors of your efforts to settle, they won’t stop trying to collect, Phelan says. Worst-case scenario, they could sue you for the amounts you owe. Should that occur the only way to avoid a black mark on your credit record would be to pay off the debt in full.

There are tax consequences. Debt settlement is a taxable event. Any forgiven balance that exceeds $600 is taxable income, says Linfield. “Sometimes that tax event can put people in worse shape than they were in to begin with,” she says. Consider this: If your tax rate is 15%, $5,000 of forgiven debt will carry a $750 tax liability. That’s a debt that the Internal Revenue Service won’t forgive. One exception: If you’re insolvent — namely your assets are less than your liabilities — you can petition the IRS to waive that tax liability by filing Form 982.

Their services might be illegal. Though the laws regulating debt-settlement companies vary greatly by state, it’s worth noting that 12 states prohibit for-profit debt management. Since debt-settlement companies are for-profit entities, they’re not allowed to practice there. Those states are Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, West Virginia and Wyoming.

If you live in one of those states, remember: It is illegal for for-profit debt-settlement companies to contact you and work with you, even if they’re based in another state. “Many companies do it anyway,” Linfield says. “And that’s a big red flag.”